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Denying Deference: Civil Rights and Judicial
Resistance to Administrative
Constitutionalism
BertrallL. Ross IIt

INTRODUCTION
What determines the level of deference the Supreme Court
gives to agency interpretations of statutes? For over a half
century, scholars have tried to make sense of the Supreme
Court's apparently inconsistent application of deference
doctrines. The leading scholarly view has been that the level of
judicial deference depends on the form the agency interpretation
takes. According to this account, when agency interpretations
are in a legislative rule adopted through notice-and-comment
procedures and have the "force of law," the Court applies a
heightened
deference
standard.1
But
when
agency
interpretations are in interpretive or other non-legislative rules
adopted through less formalized procedure and lack the "force of
law," the Court usually gives only minimal deference. 2 I term
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of California-Berkeley School of Law. The
author would like to thank Christopher Edley, Jamal Greene, Maggie Lemos, Gillian
Metzger, Anne Joseph O'Connell, and participants at the University of Chicago Legal
Forum symposium on the Civil Rights Act at 50 years and the Duke Law School Culp
Colloquium for their helpful comments and generous feedback. I owe my greatest
appreciation to Joy Milligan for her ideas and inspiration along with careful reads of
several drafts.
1 Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 gave agencies the
authority, and established the procedural framework that agencies were required to
follow, to issue legislative rules. See 5 USC § 553. Legislative rules are also referred to
as substantive rules and, according to the Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act, such rules are "issued by an agency pursuant to statutory
authority[,] ... implement the statute, [and] ... have the force and effect of law." United
States Department of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act, 30 n 3 (1947). See also Note, Rule Making: Some Definitions Under the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 35 Georgetown L J 491, 496-97 (1947) ("A
substantive rule then might well be described as an agency statement, with force and
effect of law, implementing by 'filling in the details' of a statute which by its terms refers
to administrative action as necessary to complete the rule of conduct sought to be
prescribed.").
2 Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946 exempts "interpretative
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the framework the "deference dichotomy" based on its sharp
distinction between legislative and interpretive rules. On some
accounts, the Court has followed the deference dichotomy since
the birth of modern administrative law, 3 though it did not
formally announce its adoption of the dichotomy until two cases
in 2000 and 2001-Christensen u Harris County4 and United
States v Mead.'
Though it is the leading explanation of judicial deference
choices, the deference dichotomy fails to account for much of the
Court's practice both before and after Christensen-Mead. In
earlier decades, the Court's actual deference patterns did not

rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice" from the formalized requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking. 5 USC
§ 553(b)(3)(A). According to the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act, interpretative rules are "rules or statements issued by an agency to
advise the public of the agency's construction of the statute and rules which it
administers." See United States Department of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on
the Administrative Procedure Act at 30 n 3 (cited in note 1). In some cases, the
distinction between legislative rules and non-legislative rules has been much more
difficult to demarcate in practice. See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law,
66 Vand L Rev 465, 473 (2013) (noting that a small subset of agency rules fall
somewhere in the middle between legislative and interpretive rules). The minimal
deference standard was first articulated in Skidmore v Swift & Co, in which the Court
explained that deference is only owed to agency interpretations to the extent that they
have the power to persuade. 323 US 134 (1944); see also Part I.A-B. At times, the Court
applied neither heightened deference nor minimal deference frameworks. I group these
cases in which the Court applies no deference with those in which it applies minimal
deference and argue that in these cases, the Court, for the most part, exercises
independent judgment over the meaning of the statute. Since disputes about the nature
of the agency action have not been central to the cases examined in this article, I do not
engage the extensive debate about how to distinguish the two forms of rules. For sources
discussing that distinction, see, for example, David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules,
Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 Yale L J 276, 286-88 (2010);
Jacob Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U Chi L Rev 1705, 1708-13 (2007); John F.
Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 Geo Wash L Rev 893, 917-923 (2004); William Funk,
A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 Admin L Rev 1321, 1324-25 (2001); Robert A.
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the LikeShould Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L J 1311, 1321-30
(1992); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 Duke
L J 381, 383-84; David R. Woodward and Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference:
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 Admin L Rev 329, 341-42 (1979); Arthur Earl
Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of
InterpretativeRules and General Statements of Policy Under the APA, 23 Admin L Rev
101, 110-12 (1971); Robert Kramer, The Place and Function of JudicialReview in the
Administrative Process, 28 Fordham L Rev 1, 85-93 (1959); Kenneth Culp Davis,
Administrative Rules Interpretative,Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 Yale L J 919, 92834 (1948).
See Part I.A.
4 529 US 576 (2000).
' 533 US 218 (2001).
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consistently follow either the deference dichotomy or the Court's
own precedents. At times, the Court applied deferential review
to mere interpretive rules, and at other times it refused to apply
such review to legislative rules.6 In the years after ChristensenMead, the Court has more closely adhered to the deference
dichotomy, but important deviations remain. 7 What explains the
Court's pattern then, if not the widely accepted deference
dichotomy or the Court's own precedents?
The primary alternative explanation, animated by a legal
realist account of judicial behavior, suggests that deference
choices are driven by judicial preferences for particular
outcomes. Scholars examining deference choices at a macro-level
have attempted to empirically test whether ideology drives
judicial deference choices in a broad number of administrative
law cases. However, they have come to contradictory
conclusions. 8 Even aside from the contradictory findings
regarding whether judges' ideology affects deference choices,
these studies assume that a particular set of factors drive
deference across all substantive fields and agencies. If in fact the
factors underlying deference choices vary depending on the field
or agency, then those factors might not be susceptible to
empirical identification using a macro-level strategy.
Another set of explanations for deference choices focuses on
judicial views about the competency of the agency administering
the statute and the complexity of the relevant legal regime.
These explanations arise from agency-specific studies that
examine how courts have treated particular agencies
administering particular statutes.9 While the agency-specific
studies, like their macro-level counterparts, provide important
insights into judicial deference choices, the factors they identify
may not generalize to other agencies or statutory regimes.
Moreover, because of their particularized focus, these agencyspecific accounts cannot address broader themes in judicial
application of deference doctrines that extend across agencies
See Part I.A-B. When I refer to the Court applying heightened or minimal
deference, it does not mean that the Court has deferred or not deferred to the particular
agency interpretation. It only refers to the Court's determination about whether to use
the agency's interpretation as a starting point for statutory meaning or to engage in its
own independent judgment about the meaning of the statute. See Part II.C.
See Part I.B.
6

8

See Part I.C.

9 See Part I.C.
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and statutes. Such patterns might not be salient when
examining judicial deference choices with respect to a particular
agency's interpretation but might become clear in patterns of
judicial deference choices with respect to multiple agencies'
interpretations.
In this Article, I pursue an alternative path toward
identifying sources of judicial deference choices, by analyzing
patterns of judicial deference toward agency interpretations in
an entire substantive area-civil rights. Civil rights is a
promising area for analysis because it is in this area that the
Court has shown some of its greatest inconsistencies in its
application of deference doctrine. Focusing on an entire
substantive field also offers an intermediate level of analysis,
steering between the macro-level and agency-specific accounts.
Civil rights are embodied in a variety of statutes enforced
by a range of agencies. Since the 1960s, Congress has enacted
statutes designed to redress discrimination in several different
areas of activity, including employment, education, public
accommodations, and voting. 10 In addition, Congress has
extended these non-discrimination protections to racial
minorities, women, the aged, and the disabled." Each of these
civil rights statutes is administered by agencies, including the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for the
employment provisions of the civil rights statutes, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for the Voting Rights Act (VRA),
and the now-defunct Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) for the education provisions of the Civil Rights
Act.12 These agencies have employed different forms of agency
interpretation, with the EEOC interpreting employment
statutes through the use of both legislative and interpretive
rules, the DOJ interpreting the voting rights statute through the
use of interpretive rules, and HEW interpreting the education
statute through the use of legislative and interpretive rules. 13

10 See, for example, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-336, 104
Stat 327, codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602, codified at 29 USC §§ 621-34; Voting Rights Act of
1965, Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified at 42 USC §§ 1973-1973bb-1; Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, coditied as amended in scattered sections of
42 USC.
" See statutes cited in note 10.
12 See statutes cited
in note 10.
s See Part II.A.
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In this article, I examine the Court's pattern of deference
toward these agencies' interpretations of civil rights statutes
over several decades. This field-level approach borrows from the
more macro-level analyses of judicial deference in that it looks
across multiple agencies and multiple statutes. It therefore
provides a more generalizable basis for understanding judicial
deference choices than an agency-specific analysis. The fieldlevel approach also borrows from the more micro-level analyses
by providing a closer qualitative examination of the particulars
of these judicial deference choices. This approach may capture
important but nuanced factors relevant to judicial deference
choices that a macro-level statistical analysis would miss.
The examination reveals that the available theories only
weakly explain the Supreme Court's deference choices in the
field of civil rights. According to the deference dichotomy, the
Court should give heightened deference to the agencies'
legislative rules and minimal to no deference to their
interpretive rules. The civil rights case law only loosely follows
this pattern. The Court has given heightened deference to some
interpretive rules and minimal or no deference to others, while
giving minimal or no deference to certain legislative rules and
heightened deference to others. The ideology account, which
suggests that judicial deference choices should turn on whether
the justice agrees ideologically with the agency's interpretation
provides, at best, a partial explanation for such choices. While
ideology may explain some portion of judicial disagreement
about whether to defer, the justices tended more often than not
to agree across the ideological spectrum about whether a
heightened or minimal deference framework applied. When the
justices disagreed about the application of deference
frameworks, the alignment of justices did not tend to accord
with the predictions of the ideology account. Finally,
explanations for judicial deference choices such as the
complexity of the legal regime and judicial views about the
agency cannot entirely account for judicial deference choices in
the civil rights domain. Because these explanations are either
statute or agency-specific, they would imply that each of the
justices should be consistent in applying deference frameworks
to particular statutes and agencies, based on how they view the
complexity of the statute or the competency of the agency. But
this has not been the case.
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Instead, judicial deference choices in the civil rights domain
appear to have been motivated by something that has gone
unnoticed in the literature thus far-judicial resistance to
"administrative constitutionalism." Gillian Metzger has defined
administrative constitutionalism as "the elaboration of new
constitutional understandings by administrative actors."14
Statutory questions about the meaning of "discrimination," what
it means to act with a discriminatory purpose or effect, and what
classes of individuals are "discrete and insular" implicate
ongoing constitutional controversies about the meaning of equal
protection and the non-discriminatory right to vote. To the
extent that agencies actively resolve these questions through
statutory interpretation, they are engaged in administrative
constitutionalism. Even if the agencies do not consciously set out
to weigh in on constitutional questions, by fleshing out statutes
that rest on constitutional values, the agencies are construing
the Constitution. These Constitution-based value judgments do
not necessarily become embedded into the Constitution itself,
but the agencies' constitutional judgments do become a part of
our broader constitutional framework and value system
represented by the statutes. 15
A distinct pattern emerges in the cases involving the
question of what level of deference to apply to agency
interpretations of civil rights statutes. When civil rights
agencies have engaged in administrative constitutionalism, the
Court has tended to refuse to apply heightened deference to the
agency's interpretation of the statute. The Court has refused to
apply heightened deference in these cases even when precedent
and the governing deference framework suggest that it shouldthus resisting administrative constitutionalism. However, when
the civil rights agency interpretations do not implicate active
constitutional controversies, the Court has tended to adhere to
14 See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative
Constitutionalism, 91 Tex L Rev 1897,
1900 (2013). See also Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 Va L Rev 799, 801 (2010)
(defining administrative constitutionalism as "regulatory agencies' interpretation and
implementation of constitutional law"); William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, A Republic
of Statutes: The New American Constitution 26-27 (Harvard 2010) (describing
administrative constitutionalism as the process by which agencies "consider and

interpret the . . . Constitution").
1"
See Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 12-18 (cited in note 14)
(describing the process by which small "c" constitutional norms established in statutes
and their interpretations become entrenched into the polity).
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the governing deference framework announced in its own
decision.
While these cases may seem to involve technicalities of
administrative law, the Court's decisions about deference
frameworks in fact implicate profound questions about authority
over constitutional meaning. When the Court denies heightened
deference to administrative constructions of the Constitution, it
is asserting control over the meaning of statutes in order to
preserve its own power to determine constitutional meaning.
The Court seems to be asserting through its resistance that it,
not the responsible agency, will play the dominant role in
defining the substance of civil rights statutes insofar as they
implicate controversial constitutional questions.
In the following, I proceed in two parts. In Part I, I describe
how scholars, and more recently the Court itself, have
attempted to rationalize the Court's pattern of deference to
agencies' statutory interpretations by distinguishing between
the deference due legislative and interpretive rules. I note that
this rationale does not itself accord with the Court's formal
precedents before 2000; further, the Court's actual deference
pattern did not entirely track either the deference dichotomy or
its formal precedents. I then consider other scholars' attempts to
explain the Court's actual deference patterns and argue that
they are not entirely satisfying either. In Part II, I focus on the
civil rights context and offer an alternative understanding of the
Court's inconsistent deference patterns, one centered on judicial
resistance to administrative constitutionalism. I provide a
theory to account for the Court's resistance and address its
implications for the future scope of civil rights statutes.
I. DEFERENCE PATTERNS & POTENTIAL RATIONALES
Statutes passed by Congress are inevitably ambiguous. The
imprecision of human language, the inability to foresee all
future circumstances of statutory application, and simple
dereliction of legislative responsibility to define terms in the face
of disagreement all contribute to this ambiguity. The
Constitution
does not
delegate
statutory
interpretive
responsibility
to any particular institution, but the
constitutional responsibilities of the judicial and executive
branches suggests that they both have an interpretive role. The
executive branch's responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be
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faithfully executed" and the judicial branch's responsibility to
adjudicate cases and controversies will inevitably require
interpretation of ambiguous laws. 16 Further, agencies also
interpret statutes when adjudicating disputes or issuing
generally applicable rules.
When courts review agency interpretations of statutes, they
must decide what level of deference applies. The Supreme Court
in its review of agency interpretations has vacillated between
applying heightened deference to some agency interpretations
and minimal to no deference to others. Until 2000, the Court did
not account for these deference choices, but scholars suggested
that they could be explained by a deference dichotomy.
According to this dichotomy, the Court applied heightened
deference to more formal agency interpretations that have the
force of law and lesser deference to informal agency
interpretations lacking such binding legal effect. When the
Supreme Court ultimately enshrined this dichotomy into case
law, some scholars saw it as a mere affirmation of an already
established pattern of judicial deference choices. 17 In the
following, I describe the pattern of deference choices and show
how it has not fit the deference dichotomy. I then examine
alternative scholarly accounts for the pattern of judicial
deference choices and argue that they are also unsatisfying.
A.

Early Judicial Deference Choices

In the early nineteenth century, the Court began to address
the question of how much deference was owed to agency
interpretations of statutes. In the 1827 case of Edwards' Lessee v
Darby,18 the Court explained that "[i]n the construction of a
doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction
of those who were called upon to act under the law, and were
appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very
great respect."1 9 A half century later in the 1877 case of United

US Const Art II, § 3; US Const Art III, § 2.
See, for example, Kristin E. Hickman and Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum L Rev 1235, 1245 (2007) ("[Christensen and
Mead] reaffirmed Skidmore as the deference standard for most administrative
interpretations.").
16

17

1s

25 US 206 (1827).

19

Id at 210.
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States v Moore,20 the Court offered a slightly different
formulation, announcing, "[t]he construction given to a statute
by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled
to the most respectful consideration, and ought not to be
overruled without cogent reasons." 21 The Court in dozens of
subsequent cases over the next seventy-five years cited and
followed these and similar articulations of the level of deference
owed to agency interpretations. 2 2 But the Court did not always
defer to agency interpretations in this way.
On many occasions, the Court exercised considerable
independent judgment as to the meaning of the statute, giving
little to no weight to agency constructions. Most famously, in the
1944 case of Skidmore v Swift and Co, 2 3 the Court in its review
of an agency order interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act
explained, "the weight of [an agency's] judgment in a particular
case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 24 This
description of the deference due the agency appeared to be much
different than the Court's prior formulations of "great respect"
and "most respectful consideration." In fact, insofar as courts
only deferred to the extent that the agency's interpretation was
persuasive, the Skidmore formulation did not appear to require
any more deference than the court would give to a litigant's
brief.2 5 The Court in Skidmore did not cite its earlier deference
20
21
22

95 US 760 (1877).
Id at 763.
See, for example, Udall v Tallman, 380 US 1, 16 (1965); United States u Leslie

Salt Co, 350 US 383, 396 (1956); Great Northern Railway Co u United States, 315 US
262, 275 (1942); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co u United States, 288 US 294, 315
(1933); FawcusMachine Co u United States, 282 US 375, 378 (1931); Logan u Davis, 233
US 613, 627 (1914); Heath u Wallace, 138 US 573, 582 (1891); United States u Johnston,
124 US 236, 253 (1888); Barbour u City of Louisville, 120 US 169, 182 (1887); Brown v
United States, 113 US 568, 571 (1885). See also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 Colum L Rev 1, 16 (1983) ("[T]hroughout most of the nineteenth
century there was ...
only limited judicial control of administrative lawinterpretation.").
23 323 US 134 (1944).
24 Id at
140.
2'
The dominant view of Skidmore deference is that it allows judges to
independently determine the meaning of statutes interpreted by agencies. See, for

example, J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, TailoringDeference to Variety with a Wink and a Nod
to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of JudicialReview of Agency
Interpretationsof Law, 36 J Legis 18, 61 (2010) ("[A]ll that Skidmore ...

guarantee[s] is
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standards so it is impossible to ascertain its understanding of
the relationship between the new and the old. Nor did the Court
in Skidmore explain the boundaries of the new deference
standard. Did it only apply to the statutory interpretations of
low-level administrators like those at issue in the case or did it
apply more broadly? Not until 2000 and 2001 did the Court
provide reasons for differentiating between the two forms of
deference. 2 6 In the intervening decades, there was no express
explanation for the choice of deference or pattern in case law for
when the Court gave deference and when it did not.
Two years after Skidmore, Congress enacted the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to rationalize agency
procedures and judicial review of agency actions. 2 7 The APA
demarcates two forms of agency action-adjudication and
rulemaking-and further subdivides the two forms into formal
and informal categories, adopting procedural requirements for
each. 28 The form of agency action most relevant to the deference
dichotomy is informal rulemaking, which over time evolved into
a principal means for agency action. 29 The APA requires that
agencies issuing rules through informal rulemaking follow a
procedure of notice and comment. 30 Under notice and comment,
that the court will give the agency's interpretation some consideration."); Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum L Rev at 3 (cited in note 22); Clark
Byse, Scope of Judicial Review in Informal Rulemaking, 33 Admin L Rev 183, 191
(1981). See also Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative State, 133
U Pa L Rev 549, 553-55 (1985) (describing statutory interpretation in the independent
mode). But more recently, two scholars engaging in an empirical examination of
Skidmore deference in the lower courts have argued that the deference model is
sometimes applied in a way that is quite deferential to the agency interpretation of the
statute. See Hickman and Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107
Colum L Rev at 1271-80 (cited in note 17) (differentiating between Skidmore as an
independent judgment model and as a model of deference that varies along a sliding
scale and finding in the courts of appeals that the latter model dominates). See also Jim
Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of
Chevron, 42 Wm & Mary L Rev 1105, 1111 (2001) (identifying three ways to
conceptualize Skidmore deference after Mead).
26 See text accompanying notes 4-5.
27 The Administrative Procedure Act, Pub L No 79-404,
60 Stat 237 (1946), codified
at 5 USC § 500 et seq.
28 See 5 USC §§
553-554.
29 M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking
Forum, 71 U Chi L Rev 1383,
1384-85 (2004) (noting the shift from adjudication as the predominant form of agency
action in the 1950s and 1960s to rulemaking in the 1970s); Reuel E. Schiller,
Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s,
53 Admin L Rev 1139, 1145-51 (2001) (describing the ascendancy of rulemaking in the
late 1960s and early 1970s).
so 5 USC §§ 553(b)-(c).
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agencies must provide members of the public with notice of a
proposed rule (principally through publication in the Federal
Register) and the opportunity to comment on it through
submission of "written data, views, or arguments" to the
agency. 3 1 Only after accounting for public comments can the
agency issue the rule. 32 This innovative method of agency action
was designed to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the
administrative state by providing for public participation in
agency decision-making. 33 Beginning in the 1970s, agencies
increasingly
turned to
notice-and-comment
rulemaking
procedures to fill statutory gaps with regulations that had the
same legal force and effect as statutes themselves. 34
The APA differentiates between the agency's authority to
issue rules to fill statutory gaps and its authority to interpret
statutes. While agencies are required to issue rules through
notice-and-comment procedures to fill statutory gaps, the APA
exempts "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice" from the
procedural requirement. 35 According to the Attorney General's
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies have the
authority to issue these non-legislative rules "to advise the
public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules
which it administers." 36 Unlike legislative rules, these nonlegislative rules do not have the same binding legal effect as
statutes.37
s 5 USC §§ 553(b)-(c). See also Cornelius M. Kerwin and Scott R. Furlong,
Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy 58-113 (CQ 2d ed
1999) (describing the rulemaking process as it has evolved).
32

5 USC § 553(c).

" See Kerwin and Furlong, Rulemaking at 158 (cited in note 31) ("Participation
contributes more . . . legitimacy to the rulemaking process [and] can also enhance the
authority of the rule.").
34 Magill, 71 U Chi L Rev at 1384-85 (cited in note 29) (noting the shift from
adjudication as the predominant form of agency action in the 1950s and 1960s to
rulemaking in the 1970s); Schiller, 53 Admin L Rev at 1145-51 (cited in note 29)
(describing the ascendancy of rulemaking in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
" 5 USC § 553(b).
1
United States Department of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative ProcedureAct at 30 n 3 (cited in note 1).
1
The inherent difficulty with distinguishing statutory gap filling from statutory
interpretation and identifying when an agency action has the force of law plagued all
future efforts to establish clear distinctions between legislative and interpretive rules.
See note 2 (citing articles assessing the difficulty of distinguishing legislative and nonlegislative rules). See also Hickman, 66 Vand L Rev at 475 (cited in note 2) (noting that
the Supreme Court has never defined the meaning of "force of law"); Cass R. Sunstein,
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In addition to establishing procedures for the different
forms of agency action, the APA also codified the scope of
judicial review of agency action. 38 Under this standard, "the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action." 39
Congress never clearly addressed the question of whether
deference was owed to agency interpretations and, if so, what
level of deference applied. 40 But the language of the APA at least
suggests Congress intended for courts to exercise independent
judgment over the meaning of statutes.4 1 Importantly, in
articulating the scope of review, Congress did not distinguish
between the different forms of agency actions. Whether the
agency issues adjudicative orders or rules, legislative rules or
interpretive rules, the same form of judicial review appears to be
applicable under the APA. 4 2
Nonetheless, different forms of judicial review and
deference to agencies quickly emerged after the enactment of the
APA. In the period immediately surrounding the debate and
adoption of the APA from 1945 to 1947, the Court applied the
Skidmore standard in a series of cases involving review of
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. 43 Most of these
Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev 187, 222 (2006) (identifying two possible interpretations
of "force of law").
"' 5 USC § 706.
39 Id. The APA provision goes on to mandate that reviewing courts:
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
accordance with law, (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
immunity; [and] (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
limitations, or short of statutory right[.]
5 USC

to
in
or
or

§ 706(2).

See, for example, Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has No Clothes:
Christensen,
Mead, and Dual Deference Standards, 54 Admin L Rev 173, 181 (2002) (explaining that
Congress has not "instruct[ed] courts when to defer to administrative interpretations").
41 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
after Chevron, 90
Colum L Rev 2071, 2086 (1990) (arguing that the scope of review provisions of the APA
"suggest[ed] a firm belief in the need for judicial checks on administration, particularly
with respect to the interpretation of law" and concluding, " [t]he view that courts should
always defer to agency interpretations is ... a poor reconstruction of the instructions of
the APA").
42 See generally 5 USC § 706.
43 See, for example, Walling u Portland Terminal Co, 330 US 148, 155 (1947)
(Jackson concurring); Fishgold v Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp, 328 US 275, 290
(1946); Social Security Board v Nierotko, 327 US 358, 369 (1946); Mabee v White Plains
40
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early cases, like Skidmore, involved low-level administrators'
interpretations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.4 4 The
application of the Skidmore standard in these cases was quite
confused as the Court sometimes cited the standard as
justification for its exercise of independent judgment over the
meaning of the statute.4 5 But at other times, the Court equated
Skidmore deference with a requirement that the Court defer to
reasonable agency interpretations of the statute.4 6 In fact, the
very author of the Skidmore opinion, Justice Robert Jackson,
became in later opinions the principal proponent of the view
that the standard required heightened deference to agency
interpretations.4 7
After the flurry of cases applying Skidmore deference in the
mid-1940s, the Court essentially stopped applying the standard
until the mid-1970s when the Court revived it in the Civil
Rights Act case of General Electric Co u Gilbert.4 8 In only four
cases in this thirty-year period did the Court subject the
agency's interpretation to the Skidmore requirement that it
have "the power to persuade."4 9 During this interlude, the Court
in several cases
gave
greater
deference
to agency
Publishing Co, 327 US 178, 182 (1946); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp v Local Number 6167,
United Mine Workers ofAmerica, 325 US 161, 169 (1945).
44 Four of the six early cases involved Supreme Court review of interpretations of
the FLSA by low-level administrators. See Walling, 330 US at 149; Mabee, 327 US at
180-82; Jewell Ridge Coal Corp, 325 US at 169; Skidmore, 323 US at 137-38.
41 See cases cited in note 44.
46 See, for example, Roland Electrical Co v Walling,
326 US 657, 676 (1946)

(appearing to conflate the heightened deference standard frequently applied prior to
Skidmore with the lesser Skidmore deference standard).
47

Walling, 330 US at 154-55 (Jackson concurring).

429 US 125, 141-42 (1976). In the period when Skidmore deference fell into
disuse, the Court at times referred to factors of contemporaneity and consistency of
agency interpretation as reasons to support granting deference. See Michael Asimow,
48

Public Participationin the Adoption of InterpretiveRules and Policy Statements, 75 Mich
L Rev 520, 566 (1977) (suggesting that courts tended to use many of these factors as
"makeweights": "Having decided whether the interpretive regulation is valid, the court
mentions all the factors it can muster that tend to support its decision"). Although the
Court sometimes cited Skidmore as the source of these factors, the Court had in cases
applying heightened deference prior to Skidmore considered these factors to be relevant
as well. See Peter L. Strauss, Deference is Too Confusing Let's Call Them Chevron
Space and Skidmore Weight, 112 Colum L Rev 1143, 1154 (2012) (identifying the
relevance of factors such as contemporaneity to the deference choice in cases dating back
to the nineteenth century).
49

See Morton u Ruiz, 415 US 199, 237 (1974);

United States v Pennsylvania

Industrial Chemical Corp, 411 US 655, 674 (1973); United States v Stapf, 375 US 118,
127 n 11 (1963); Federal Maritime Board v Isbrandtsen Co, Inc, 356 US 481, 499-500
(1958).
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interpretations. This heightened deference standard received its
most prominent application in the 1965 case of Udall v
Tallman.50 Deferring to the Secretary of Interior's interpretation
of an Executive Order, Justice Earl Warren announced for a
unanimous Court:
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this
Court shows great deference to the interpretation given
the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration. "To sustain the Commission's application
of this statutory term, we need not find that its
construction is the only reasonable one or even that it is
the result we would have reached had the question arisen
in the first instance in judicial proceedings."5 1
This deference framework emerged as the leading standard
of judicial review of agency interpretations in the period from
the mid-1960s to the late-1970s. 52 As suggested by the phrase
"great deference," the Court usually deferred to agency
interpretations under this standard. 53
In the thirty years following the APAs enactment, the
Court never explained why it gave heightened deference to some
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes and little to no
deference to others. Legal scholars attempted to pick up the
slack. Perhaps the most prominent administrative law scholar
writing in this era, Kenneth Culp Davis, suggested that the level

'o

380 US 1 (1965).

Id at 16, quoting Unemployment Commission of Territory ofAlaska v Aragon, 329
US 143, 153 (1946).
12 For cases applying the "great deference" standard, see, for example
Aluminum Co
51

of America v Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District, 467 US 380, 389-90 (1984);
Blanding u DuBose, 454 US 393, 401 (1982); Federal Election Commission v Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 US 27, 31-32 (1981); Howe v Smith, 452 US 473,
485 (1981); Environmental Protection Agency v National Crushed Stone Association, 449
US 64, 83 (1980); United States u Rutherford, 442 US 544, 553 (1979); Oscar Mayer & Co
u Evans, 441 US 750, 761 (1979); Gladstone, Realtors u Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91,
107 (1979); United States u Consumer Life Insurance Co, 430 US 725, 751-52 (1977);
National Labor Relations Board v Bell Aerospace Co, Division of Textron, Inc, 416 US
267, 274-75 (1974); Johnson u Robison, 415 US 361, 367-68 (1974); Trafficante v
MetropolitanLife Insurance Co, 409 US 205, 210 (1972); Zuber v Allen, 396 US 168, 192
(1969); Zemel v Rusk, 381 US 1, 11 (1965). In addition, as discussed in further detail in
Part II, the Court applied this "great deference" framework to agency interpretations of
civil rights statutes, including Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting
Rights Act. See Part II.B.
" See note 52.
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of deference turned on the nature of the agency action. In an
article written immediately after the flurry of Supreme Court
cases applying the Skidmore standard, Davis explained that the
Court "has consistently held that judicial judgment should not
be substituted for administrative judgment on questions within
the agency's statutory power of rule-making."5 4 Here, Davis was
referring to agency authority under statutes to promulgate
legislative rules through the notice-and-comment procedure.
Davis suggested that deference to legislative rules accorded with
congressional intent "that the determination of the content of
the rules should be made by the agency and not by the courts." 5
Such intent, he explained, was absent in the context of
interpretive rules. 56 For these rules, "substitution of judicial
judgment . . . is always permissible."5 7 As a guide to such
exercises of independent judicial judgment, Davis pointed to the
standard articulated in Skidmore.5 8
Even though Davis cited to a handful of cases in which this
deference dichotomy held, the subsequent pattern of case law
did not accord with his explanation of judicial application of
deference doctrine. In the flurry of cases in the late 1940s and
the handful of cases thereafter, the Court did apply Skidmore
deference exclusively to interpretive rules and policy
statements.5 9 But when "great deference" emerged as the
leading deference framework in the mid-1960s, the Court
applied it to these same forms of agency actions. 0 The only
14
See Kenneth Culp Davis, Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action, 50
Colum L Rev 559, 586 (1950).
Id at 587.
1
See United States Department of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act at 30 n 3 (cited in note 1) (distinguishing between
substantive rules issued pursuant to an agency's statutory authority and interpretative
rules and general statements of policy that are not).
Davis, 50 Colum L Rev at 588 (cited in note 54).
58
See id. In 1958, Davis published the Administrative Law Treatise, which would
serve as the most important statement of administrative procedure and the scope of
review for the next quarter century. In the treatise, Davis re-asserted the dichotomy
between heightened deference to legislative rules and minimal deference to interpretive
rules first articulated in his 1950 law review article. See Kenneth Culp Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 5.05 at 314-15 (West 1958). This statement of the law
went virtually unchallenged in the literature perhaps because of the normative appeal of
the dichotomy between the deference owed to interpretations adopted through more
formalized procedures with public involvement and that owed to less formalized
procedures without such public involvement.
'9 See notes 43-45.
60
See note 52.

238

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2014

pattern evidenced in the case law is one in which the Court
relied more heavily on the Skidmore deference doctrine in a
period surrounding the adoption of the APA and then on a much
more deferential standard in a later period beginning in the
mid-1960s with little regard to the form of the agency action. 6 1
In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court revived the Skidmore
deference doctrine in a case involving the interpretation of the
Civil Rights Act. 62 A year after the Court revived Skidmore, the
Court in Batterton u Francis63 appeared to pump some judicial
life into Professor Davis's deference dichotomy.6 4 In a footnote to
the decision, the Court distinguished between legislative rules
"issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority" that have

6' The dominance of the heightened deference standard by the early 1970s was
reflected most clearly in the efforts of Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas to amend the
APA. The legislation that became known as the "Bumpers Amendment" was introduced
in 1975 and called for amendment of the judicial review provision of the APA to require
the reviewing court to decide de novo "all relevant questions of law." S 86, 95th Cong, 1st
Sess (Jan 10, 1977), in 123 Cong Rec 639 (Jan 10, 1977) (describing a proposal to amend
section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC § 706). See also Carl McGowan,
Regulatory Analysis and Judicial Review, 42 Ohio St L J 627, 630 n 8 (1981) (describing
different iterations of the Bumpers Amendment bill). Senator Bumpers argued that the
amendment was necessary to restore the judicial authority established in Marbury v
Madison "to say what the law is," 5 US 137, 177 (1803), which had been eviscerated by
courts "virtually rubber-stamping every agency action that comes before them for
review." S 800, 94th Cong, 2d Sess (July 1, 1976), in 122 Cong Rec 22012 (July 1, 1976).
Another supporter of the amendment explained, "[t]he Bumpers amendment is simple. It
takes away the now court-recognized principle that a Federal agency's interpretation of
Federal law is presumed to be correct." S 1477, 96th Cong, 1st Sess, in 125 Cong Rec
23498 (Sept 7, 1979) (providing the statement of Senator James Exon). The proponents
of the Bumpers Amendment may have exaggerated the extent of judicial deference to
agency interpretations of law and may have had an ulterior deregulatory motive in a
context of proliferating economic and social regulations. See Cornelius B. Kennedy, The
Bumpers Amendment: Regulating the Regulators, 67 ABA J 1639, 1641 (1981)
(describing the impetus for the Bumpers Amendment); James T. O'Reilly, Deference
Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers JudicialReview Amendment, 49
U Cin L Rev 739, 747-49 (1980) (describing the origins of the Bumpers Amendment).
But the case law from the ten-year period to its introduction does suggest that the court
regularly applied the "great deference" model and typically deferred to agency
interpretations of statutes. See also Woodward and Levin, 31 Admin L Rev at 332 (cited
in note 2) (describing the Court's present practice as one in which, when the Court
reviews administrative actions, it "frequently begin[s] [its] analysis of a disputed
question of construction by assuming that the agency's interpretation is correct and then
inquiring whether other factors outweigh the agency's view"); Asimow, 75 Mich L Rev at
565-66 (cited in note 48) (describing recent developments in judicial review of
interpretive rules and noting that "courts nearly always defer to interpretive
regulations" and that "[c]ourts seldom employ the sort of free-wheeling substitution of
judgment that the traditional model permits").
62 See note 52 and accompanying text.
6' 432 US 416 (1977).
64 Id.
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"the force and effect of law" and interpretive rules that
presumptively lack these qualities. 65 The latter form of agency
interpretations, the Court offered in dictum, is accorded
"[v]arying degrees of deference ...

based on such factors as the

timing and consistency of the agency's position, and the nature
of its expertise."6 6
Despite suggesting a standardization of deference doctrine
in the Batterton footnote,6 7 the Court after Batterton continued
to alternate between the "great deference" and Skidmore
deference standard without any apparent rhyme or reason. 68
Scholars trying to make sense of the seeming randomness in
judicial applications of deference doctrines suggested that the
two standards were in fact one-that the "great deference"
standard was merely a variation of Skidmore deference. 69 But
while the Court did at times conflate the two standards, there is

£1

See Batterton, 432 US at 425 n 9. See also John S. Moot, Comment, An Analysis

of Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 1 Admin L J 213, 217 (1987)
(describing Batterton as the first instance in which the Court distinguished between
interpretative and legislative rules).
6 See Batterton, 432 US at 425 n 9.
£7 Arguably, the Court in Batterton was not applying the
deference dichotomy at all.
Instead, the Court seemed to be drawing a distinction between interpretations
promulgated on the basis of expressly delegated congressional authority and rules that
are not. As to rules promulgated pursuant to an implicit delegation of authority, like
those that arise in the context of statutory ambiguity, the Court in Batterton never
committed to a standard of deference. See id at 425-26.
£8 The post-Batterton, pre-Chevron cases applying the "great
deference" standard
include Aluminum Co of America, 467 US at 389-90; Blanding, 454 US at 401,

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 US at 31-32; Howe, 452 US at 485;
National Crushed Stone Association, 449 US at 83; Rutherford, 442 US at 553; Evans,
441 US at 761; GladstoneRealtors, 441 US at 107. The post-Batterton, pre-Chevron cases

applying Skidmore deference include St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v South
Dakota, 451 US 772, 783 n 13 (1981); Watt v Alaska, 451 US 259, 272-73 (1981);
Steadman v Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 US 91, 103-04 (1981); City of Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power v Manhart,435 US 702, 714 n 26 (1978); Adamo
Wrecking Co v United States, 434 US 275, 287-89 n 5 (1978). See also Goering, 36 J
Legis at 42 (cited in note 25) ("In the early 1980's, the Supreme Court's decisions
reviewing administrative interpretations typically followed one of . . . two deference
frameworks and commonly ignored the other, with little or no explanation.").
69

See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent,

101 Yale L J 969, 972-74 (1992) (describing the pre-Cheoron regime as an amalgamation
of the Skidmore and "great deference" frameworks); but see Goering, 36 J Legis at 42
(cited in note 25) (arguing that in the period between Batterton and Chevron, "the
Supreme Court's decisions reviewing administrative interpretations typically followed
one of these two deference frameworks and commonly ignored the other, with little or no
explanation").
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significant evidence that the justices did not consider them
equivalent. 70
Judicial Deference Choices after the Chevron Revolution

B.

The so-called "revolution" in deference doctrine came in
1984 when the Court famously established a two-step
framework for judicial review of agency interpretations in

Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.7 1 At
step one, the Court determines whether Congress had a clear
intent with respect to the particular issue addressed by the
agency. 72 If the intent is clear, the Court and agency must give
effect to the unambiguous preferences of Congress. 73 But if the
statute is silent or ambiguous on the particular question, courts
should proceed to step two and decide "whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."7 4
From the perspective of deference doctrine, the Chevron twostep framework was not really anything new. Courts had always
rejected agency interpretations inconsistent with the clear
intent
of Congress. 75 The
requirement
that
agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes be merely permissible is
really no different than the "great deference" standard, which
notes that courts need not find that the agency "construction is
the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result [the Court]
would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance
in judicial proceedings."7 6
Importantly, however, the Court in Chevron appeared to
reject the deference dichotomy. Chevron seemed to establish a
uniform deference doctrine to be applied to all agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes on the basis of an implicit
70

See Part H.A.

71

467 US 837 (1984).

72

Id at 842-43.

Id.
Id at 843.
7
See, for example, Espinoza v FarahManufacturing Co, 414 US 86, 88-89 (1973)
(holding that an EEOC interpretive guideline was not entitled to great deference because
it was inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress). See also Hickman and Krueger, In
Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum L Rev at 1241 (2007) (cited in note
17) ("Even before Cheuron, if the meaning of a statute was clear, there was no
opportunity for an agency to claim judicial deference.").
7
Udall, 380 US at 16. In fact, in cases subsequent to Cheuron, the Court did not
treat the deference model as unique as it continued to rely on pre-Cheoron cases to
support the application of heightened deference.
7

74
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delegation theory-when Congress has left gaps and ambiguities
in a statute, it has implicitly delegated to the agencies
responsible for administering the statute the authority to fill
those gaps and clarify those ambiguities. 7 7 Consistent with this
implicit delegation theory, the Court in the years immediately
following
Chevron
applied
the
two-step
framework
indiscriminately to both legislative and interpretive rules
construing ambiguous statutes.7 8
But the Court in this period also limited Chevron
deference's apparent broad domain, with little explanation.
Beginning with cases reviewing agency interpretations of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Court revived Skidmore
deference for a second time.79 Between Chevron in 1984 and
Christensen v Harris County in 2000, most of the cases in which
the Court applied Skidmore deference involved interpretations
of civil rights statutes-an issue I turn to in Part II.
Noting the Court's failure to apply Chevron in the civil
rights context, some scholars again turned to the deference
dichotomy. To the extent the Court had refused to defer to
interpretive rules offered by civil rights agencies, these scholars
saw the move as a justified one. They argued that uniform
application of a heightened deference standard to both
legislative and interpretive rules would create incentives for
resource-constrained agencies to proceed via the path of least
resistance. If the Court applied Chevron deference uniformly,
agencies would simply bypass the more onerous notice-andcomment process and substitute interpretive rules for legislative
rules.8 0 This workaround would diminish public participation in

7
The Court explained, "Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency." Cheuron, 467 US at 844.
78 For cases in which the Court applied Cheuron deference to interpretive and other
non-legislative rules, see, for example, NationsBank of North Carolina,NA v Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Co, 513 US 251 (1995); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp U The
LTV Corp, 496 US 633 (1990); Mead Corp u Tilley, 490 US 714 (1989); Young a
Community Nutrition Institute, 476 US 974 (1986); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp U
PhiladelphiaGear Corp, 476 US 426 (1986).
79 See note 222 and accompanying text.
so Beginning in the 1970s, procedural demands on notice-and-comment rulemaking
from the judicial and executive branches made the process much more onerous. See
Richard J. Pierce Jr, Seven Ways to Ossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin L Rev 59, 6265 (1995). As a result, "the simple, efficient notice and comment process" was
transformed "into an extraordinarily lengthy, complicated, and expensive process." Id at
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agency decision-making processes, the most celebrated
innovation of the Administrative Procedures Act.8 1 So when the
Court applied Skidmore deference to interpretive rules in the
civil rights context, it was a welcome revival of a deference
dichotomy that subjected agencies to a "pay me now, or pay me
later" mandate. 82 Agencies could pay costs in terms of resources
and time now by engaging in the onerous rulemaking process
and receive heightened deference for their statutory
interpretations under the Chevron doctrine. Or alternatively,
agencies could bypass the notice-and-comment process through
the issuance of interpretive rules but pay costs later by having
their interpretations subjected to greater judicial scrutiny under
the Skidmore standard.
Proponents of the deference dichotomy appeared to secure
an important victory when the Court formally enshrined it into
judicial doctrine in cases decided during the first two years of
the twenty-first century, Christensen v Harris County 83 and

United States v Mead Corp.84 Christensen and Mead involved
questions about the level of deference owed to agency
interpretations in the form of interpretive rules. The Court,
citing an updated edition of Kenneth Culp Davis's
administrative law treatise and a few post-Chevron cases (while
ignoring other inconsistent post-Chevron cases85 ), held that a
Department of Labor opinion letter and United States Customs
Services tariff classification rulings were entitled to only
Skidmore deference. 86 The Court explained that when there is a
congressional delegation of authority to the agency, Chevron
deference applied to the agency's interpretations of statutes.8 7

65.
81 Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof
Law, 1989

Duke L J 511, 514 (1989).
82 See E. Donald Elliot, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 Duke
L J 1490, 1491 (1992).

529 US 576 (2000).
84

533 US 218 (2001).

Scalia discussed these inconsistent cases in his concurrence in Christensen and
dissent in Mead. See Christensen,529 US at 590 (Scalia concurring) (citing several cases
in which the Court gave Cheuron deference to agency interpretations in the form of nonlegislative rules); Mead, 533 US at 240-41 (Scalia dissenting) (re-citing the cases in
which the Court gave Cheuron deference to interpretive rules and chastising the
majority for "largely replac[ing] Cheuron ... with that test most beloved by a court
unwilling to be held to rules . . . thol' 'totality of the circumstances' test").
86 See Christensen, 529 US at 587.
87 See Mead, 533 US
at 227.
8'
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Such delegation is indicative of a congressional intent to give the
agency interpretations the force of law.88 But when an agency
advances an interpretation in the absence of a congressional
delegation of authority, the Court will defer to that
interpretation only insofar as it is persuasive under the
Skidmore standard.8 9 While the Court gave itself some room to
navigate around the deference dichotomy,9 0 many viewed the
two cases as complete acceptance of what Davis and others had
advocated for a half-century. 91
Since Christensen and Mead, the Court has applied the
deference dichotomy with greater consistency. 92 When it has
applied a deference model, the Court seems to have been more
consistent in applying Skidmore or lesser deference to
interpretive rules and heightened Chevron deference to
legislative rules. 93 But the Court has continued to deviate from
the deference dichotomy in some cases. In particular, the Court
has proved reluctant to apply Chevron deference to agency
interpretations of civil rights statutes in the form of legislative
rules. It has used a variety of workarounds to avoid giving
Chevron deference
to these
agency
interpretations-

See id.

See id at 227-28.
For example, the Court explained that for purposes of applying Chevron
deference, congressional delegations of authority do not necessarily have to be explicit,
as other factors such as the formality of the procedure involved in the adoption of the
agency rule may indicate a congressional intent to delegate. But the Court emphasized
that "express congressional authorizations to engage in rulemaking or formal
89
90

adjudication" are "a very good indicator of delegation meriting Cheuron treatment." Id at

229.
91 David Barron and Elena Kagan offered an alternative
interpretation of
Christensen and Mead suggesting that the cases established "an internal agency nondelegation doctrine" that limited the ability of agency officials to sub-delegate decisionmaking to others. See David J. Barron and Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation
Doctrine, 2001 S Ct Rev 201, 201-04 (2001). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury:
The Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L J 2580, 2603 (2006) (arguing
that "Mead should be seen as an unusual case in an exceedingly unusual setting, in
which low-level administrators were required to produce thousands of rulings, in a way
that undermined the view that the executive branch should receive deference").
92
See Hickman, 66 Vand L Rev at 489 (cited in note 2).
93 I have not found an empirical study that contrasts the application of the
deference dichotomy pre- and post-Mead. But logic would suggest that since the
deference dichotomy was not established in doctrine prior to Mead that the Court would
be more consistent in its application of the dichotomy after Mead. This question is ripe
for empirical examination, as it would provide more insight on the effect of doctrine on
judicial decision-making.
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workarounds the Court appears to be less inclined to use in
other contexts.9 4
The history of judicial application of deference doctrine to
agency interpretations has thus been one where the Court has
largely failed to follow any single, coherent deference
framework, whether by adhering to the deference dichotomy or
by consistently following either of its own two prior
formulations, the "great deference" or Skidmore's "power to
persuade" standard.
Explanations for the Court's actual deference patterns have
been limited thus far by the tendency of scholars to focus on
judicial application of deference doctrine at the macro-level
across all administrative domains or at the micro-level
examining particular statutes and agencies. As I show in the
next section, these analyses have provided explanations that are
either incomplete or overly speculative.
C.

Current Explanations for the Court's Deference Patterns

Since the deference dichotomy provides at best only a
partial account of Supreme Court applications of deference, how
can we understand the Court's actual pattern of deference? At
the macro level, scholars assessing judicial application of
deference doctrines in all administrative law domains have
addressed this question only indirectly, providing incomplete
and contradictory answers. At the micro level, scholars
evaluating judicial application of deference doctrine in specific
regulatory domains have addressed the question more directly,
but their answers are either speculative or cannot be
generalized to other contexts.
1.

Macro-level accounts.

Some scholars have used quantitative empirical methods to
analyze whether political ideology predicts individual justices'
votes to accord heightened deference across a broad set of cases.
Unfortunately, the two primary studies to date have arrived at
conflicting results.
In one study, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein examined all
eighty-four decisions between 1980 and 2005 in which the

94

See Part II.B.4
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Supreme Court reviewed agency interpretations of statutes and
the majority either applied Chevron deference or the concurring
or dissenting justices argued that Chevron deference should
have applied.9 5 Miles and Sunstein found "little variation overall
in the rate at which the . .. justices voted to apply Chevron."9 6
From this finding, the scholars surmised that the justices were
constrained by doctrine to apply Chevron in the overwhelming
majority of the cases.97 Judicial deviations from the application
of Chevron had little to do with ideology.
In the second study, Connor Raso and William Eskridge
came to the opposite conclusion. The scholars asked whether the
Court treated deference doctrines as precedent with stare decisis
effect or as canons of construction in which ideological factors
influence the application of deference doctrine. 98 Examining 667
Supreme Court cases involving agency interpretations of federal
statutes between Chevron (1984) and Haindan v Rumsfeld99
(2006), the authors found that the "justices systematically
support less deferential regimes for policies with which they
disagree."10 0 Raso and Eskridge concluded, "ideological concerns
influence application of deference doctrine."10 1
95 See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?
An EmpiricalInvestigation of Chevron, 73 U Chi L Rev 823, 825 (2006).
96 Id at 843.
97 See id at 843-44 (acknowledging the tentative nature of these conclusions
because of the small sample size of cases).
98 Connor N. Raso and William N. Eskridge Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a
Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases,
110 Colum L Rev 1727, 1732 (2010).
99 126 S Ct 2749 (2006).
100 Raso and Eskridge, 110 Colum L Rev at 1784 (cited in note 98). The scholars
found the "correlation between ideological preferences and deference regime preferences
is 0.92, with liberal justices favoring less deferential regimes than the conservatives
when conservative agency interpretations are at issue." And "[w]hen only liberal agency
policies are analyzed, the results are reversed: Liberals support more deferential regimes
and conservatives support less deferential regimes." Id at 1787.
101 Id at 1734. The conflicting findings are likely the result of the differences in the
data used. Miles and Sunstein focused on a much narrower subset of cases involving
explicit controversies about the applicability of Chevron deference while Raso and
Eskridge analyzed a much broader set of cases for which a variety of deference doctrines
were potentially applicable. It could be the case that once Raso and Eskridge narrowed
their dataset to cases in which justices explicitly contested whether Chevron applied,
they would reach the same conclusions as Miles and Sunstein-that these disputes about
the choice of deference were not driven by ideology. In two other studies, Thomas Merrill
examined all Supreme Court decisions between 1981 and 1990 and found that the Court
often ignored Chevron, only applying its deference doctrine to one third of the postChevron cases in which at least one justice found that the case raised an issue of
deference. See Thomas W. Merrill, 101 Yale L J at 982-85 (cited in note 69). Merrill did
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These conflicting macro-level empirical results about the
influence of ideology on judicial deference choices leave us
searching for answers. The question ultimately may not be
conducive to quantitative analysis as factors not as easily
quantifiable as ideology may be influencing the justices'
deference choices. Attempting to explain the Court's choices in
more nuanced ways, other scholars have looked to judicial
application of deference regimes in agency-specific contexts.
2.

Agency-specific accounts.

Agency-specific accounts have focused principally on the
post-Chevron application of deference doctrine in three
administrative
law
contexts-tax,
environmental,
and
employment discrimination law. 102 Scholars in the tax context

not offer a theory to explain why the Court applied Cheuron so infrequently. William
Eskridge and Lauren Baer examined all 1,014 cases between Cheuron in 1984 and
Hamdan u Rumsfeld in 2005 "in which an agency interpretation of a statute was at
issue." They found that the Court applied Cheuron deference in 8.3 percent of the cases,
Skidmore deference in 6.7 percent of the cases and no deference at all in 53.6 percent of
the cases. William N. Eskridge Jr and Lauren E. Baer, Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
Georgetown L J 1083, 1089-90 (2008). Eskridge and Baer concluded, "[T]he Court
invokes deference regimes in a manner that is seemingly sporadic and haphazard." Id at
1137.
102 See generally Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice of
Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretationsof Title VII, 63 Vand L Rev 363 (2010);
Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory
Interpretation,and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U Colo L Rev 767
(2008); Kristen E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
JudicialDeference, 90 Minn L Rev 1537 (2006); Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise:
The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 Fordham L Rev 1937 (2006); Rebecca Hanner
White, Deference and Disability Discrimination,99 Mich L Rev 532 (2000); Theodore W.
Wern, Note, JudicialDeference to EEOC Interpretationsof the Civil Rights Act, the ADA,
and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 Ohio St L J 1533 (1999);
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va L
Rev 1717 (1997); David A. Brennen, Treasury Regulations and Judicial Deference in the
Post-CheoronEra, 13 Ga St U L Rev 387 (1997); John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax
Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 Geo Wash L Rev 35 (1995);
Linda Galler, JudicialDeference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent Standards,
56 Ohio St L J 1037 (1995); Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts and
Employment DiscriminationPolicy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory
Interpretation, 1995 Utah L Rev 51 (1995); Jamie A Yavelberg, The Revival of Skidmore
v. Swift: JudicialDeference to Agency InterpretationsAfter EEOC v. Aramco, 42 Duke L
J 166 (1992); Moot, 1 Admin L J at 213 (cited in note 65). One study also examined
deference choices in the immigration context. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and
Immigration Law, 74 U Chi L Rev 1671, 1679-82 (2007) (examining Judge Richard
Posner's jurisprudence reviewing agency adjudications in immigration cases and
suggesting that "skepticism in immigration cases appears to be driven by a judgment
about comparative institutional competence").
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have tried to explain the Supreme Court's decision to leave
unresolved the deference owed to Internal Revenue Service
interpretations of the tax code as well as broader judicial
deviations from the deference dichotomy. 103 The Court, without
explanation, typically gives heightened deference to the agency's
interpretation of the tax code even when the interpretations do
not take the form of legislative rules.104 Rather than attributing
deviations from the deference dichotomy to ideology, tax
scholars have suggested that heightened deference in tax cases
may represent the judicial recognition of the IRS's comparative
advantage in resolving complex technical questions of tax law.10 5
Other scholars have examined appellate courts' review of
the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretations of
environmental statutes. One study found that the appellate
courts show "a strong willingness to defer, under any doctrine or
framework, to agency action when environmental scientific
expertise is required."10 6 Similar to the tax context, this evidence
suggests that judicial perceptions of comparative agency
expertise may influence the decisions of when to defer under
either of the major deference doctrines. The same study also
found some evidence that courts use Chevron deference
strategically to achieve particular ideological outcomes. 107
Finally, scholars examining the employment discrimination
context have focused principally on the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's interpretation of employment
discrimination statutes. These studies also found recurring
Supreme Court deviations from the deference dichotomy and

'os See, for example, Hickman, 90 Minn L Rev at 1588 (cited in note 102) ("[T]he
Court's post-Chevron analysis in both tax and non-tax deference cases is devoid of any
hint that the legislative/interpretive distinction governs the assessment of Chevron's
applicability."); Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 56 Ohio St L J at 1074
(cited in note 102) (noting the Supreme Court's failure to articulate a deference standard
in the tax cases).
104 See Galler, 56 Ohio St L J at 1042 (cited in note 102) ("[C]ourts are
increasingly
likely to treat [informal] revenue rulings like regulations by deferring to IRS positions
that are set forth in the revenue ruling format."). Scholars have referred to this as "tax
exceptionalism." See, for example, Hickman, 90 Minn L Rev at 1541 (cited in note 102).
10
See Hickman, 90 Minn L Rev at 1600 (cited in note 102). ("[T]he expertise
necessary in interpreting the Code . . . justifies imputing to Congress the decision to
grant Treasury such broad, primary interpretative authority."). See also Galler, 56 Ohio
St L J at 1077-79 (cited in note 102) (speculating that the complexity of the tax code was
the reason for judges being more willing to defer to IRS revenue rulings).
106 See Czarnezki, 79 U Colo L Rev at 771 (cited in note 102).
107 Id at 795-96.
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have offered a variety of explanations for the inconsistencies. 108
These include the non-technical nature of the subject, the
importance of the employment discrimination statutes, the lack
of judicial regard for the expertise of the EEOC, and suspicion
about the EEOC's agenda.10 9 These explanations are, however,
speculative as the supporting evidence is somewhat limited. 110
Focusing
on
judicial
review
of specific
agency
interpretations offers the promise of identifying sources of
deviations from the deference dichotomy that are likely to be
context-specific. But the micro-level assessments have not
offered a systematic account of why courts deviate from the
deference dichotomy. A major challenge is disentangling judicial
views of particular agencies from other reasons for the judicial
applications of particular deference doctrines. It is difficult to
know whether judicial deviations from the deference dichotomy
are driven by views of the EEOC, EPA, or IRS, the statutes they
administer, or whether some other factors account for the
Court's choice about deference doctrine.
II. JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Over the past forty years, many of the Court's most glaring
inconsistencies in its application of deference doctrine have
arisen in the context of judicial review of agency interpretations
of civil rights statutes. In the mid-1970s, the Court broke from
its prior pattern of "great deference" and began to apply
Skidmore deference to agencies' interpretations of the meaning
of discrimination or discriminatory effect under civil rights
statutes. Later, after the so-called Chevron revolution in
deference doctrine, the Court again revived Skidmore deference
applying it to agency interpretations of discrimination and
discriminatory purpose under civil rights statutes. Finally, after
the Court firmly established the deference dichotomy in

108 See Hart, 74 Fordham L Rev at 1937 (cited in note 102); White, 99 Mich L Rev at
569-71 (cited in note 102); Wern, 60 Ohio St L J at 1578-80 (cited in note 102).
109 See, for example, Hart, Skepticism and Expertise, 74 Fordham L Rev at 1937
(cited in note 102); White, Deference and Disability Discrimination,99 Mich L Rev at
569-71 (cited in note 102); Wern, JudicialDeference to EEOC Interpretations,60 Ohio St
L J at 1578-80 (cited in note 102).
110 See text accompanying note 109 (providing explanations for deviations from
deference dichotomy in speculative terms).
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doctrine, the Court continued to deny heightened deference to
legislative rules defining the classes of individuals entitled to
special protection under the civil rights statutes.
These breakdowns in the deference dichotomy are best
understood
as
judicial
resistance
to
administrative
constitutionalism. Regardless of the form that the agency
interpretation took or what precedent dictated, the Court in
these periods applied a framework of minimal or no deference
when the agency's statutory interpretive judgment implicated
an ongoing constitutional controversy.
In thus resisting administrative constitutionalism, the
Court asserted its authority over constitutional meaning. Like
the Court's rejection of congressional authority under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to define the substance of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Court through
resistance to administrative constitutionalism has denied
agencies similar authority over constitutional meaning. In this
respect, such resistance represents another assertion of judicial
supremacy-the idea that the Court is the final and exclusive
interpreter of the Constitution. The Court's assertion of judicial
supremacy in its review of agency interpretations has had a
profound impact on the evolving meaning of civil rights statutes,
one that will likely continue into the future.
In the following, I argue that judicial resistance to
administrative constitutionalism explains the Court's deference
pattern by examining the Court's review of agency
interpretations of civil rights statutes in three eras: pre-

Chevron, post-Chevron, and the Christensen-Mead eras. I focus
on judicial review of agencies' interpretations of five major civil
rights statutes-Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
the Voting Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. I then identify the
link
between
judicial
resistance
to
administrative
constitutionalism and judicial supremacy. I conclude this Part
by exploring the implications of judicial resistance to
administrative constitutionalism for statutory civil rights' past
and future.
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Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Civil Rights
Statutes

The dominant account to date indicates that the form of
agency action-whether it is in the form of an interpretive rule
or a legislative rule-dictates judicial choices about what level of
deference to apply. But in the civil rights domain, neither the
deference dichotomy, nor any competing explanations, whether
found in the Court's precedent or in the more "realist"
explanations like ideology or the Court's appraisal of particular
agencies' technical expertise, seem to explain such choices. What
the case law instead evidences is an alternative axis for judicial
deference choices that is often in tension with the deference
dichotomy-judicial
resistance
to
administrative
constitutionalism.
1.

The Civil Rights Statutes of the 1960s.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 represent two of the most important anti-discrimination
statutes that Congress has ever enacted. Titles VI and VII of the
Civil Rights Act and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act were
focal points of agency-judicial contestation over statutory
meaning in the pre-Cheoron era.111 All three statutes left critical
terms undefined, thus vesting significant powers in the
implementing agencies and provoking tension when courts and
agencies disagreed.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits racial
discrimination in "any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 112 The title empowers agencies responsible
for providing federal financial assistance to government
programs or activities (twenty-two agencies at the time of
enactment) to enforce the title through the issuance of
presidentially-approved "rules, regulations, or orders of general
applicability." 1 1 3 The agencies have authority to terminate
federal funds if "there has been an express finding on the record,
after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with [the

n. See 42 USC §§ 2000d, 2000e, 1973b(a)(1), 1973c(a).
112 42 USC §
2000d.
ns 42 USC

§ 2000d-1.
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regulatory] requirement."1 14 Because of challenges associated
with the coordination of multiple-agency enforcement of the
statute, several of the agencies sub-delegated (with the
encouragement of the Department of Justice) their enforcement
authority to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW).115 HEW emerged as the lead administrator of Title VI
and employed its enforcement authority to not only issue rules
and regulations in accordance with the statute, but to also issue
guidelines interpreting the statute that did not require
presidential approval. 116

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, national origin, religion, and
sex. 117 The principal provision of the title, section 703(a)(1)
makes it unlawful for the employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."1 1 8
Unlike Title VI, Title VII primarily relies on a private litigation
model of enforcement.1 19 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which was created to administer the Act, has the
authority to investigate a charge of a Title VII violation and
determine whether there is "reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true." 120 Under the original 1964 Act, once the
Commission made the determination of reasonable cause, it only
had the authority to eliminate the unlawful employment
practice through informal methods of "conference, conciliation,
and persuasion." 12 1 In the 1972 amendment to the Act, Congress
gave the Commission the authority to file suit against

114

Id.

n. See Linda R. Singer, et al, eds, Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964Implementation and Impact, 36 Geo Wash L Rev 824, 869-71 (1968).
n1 See id at 871; Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory
Model for Defining "Discrimination",70 Georgetown L J 1, 40 (1981).
117 See 42 USC §
2000e.
42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
See Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits
in the U.S. 98-119 (Princeton 2010) (describing the legislative compromises that led to
the private litigation model).
120 42 USC § 2000e-5(b). See also White, 1995 Utah L
Rev at 60-63 (cited in note
102) (describing the powers and duties of the EEOC).
121 42 USC § 2000e-5(b).
11

19
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employers. 122 Congress, however, denied the commission the
authority to issue cease-and-desist orders and only gave the
commission authority to promulgate "suitable procedural
regulations." 12 3 Nonetheless, despite the absence of explicit
statutory authority, the Commission did issue guidelines
interpreting Title VII resting its exercise of interpretive
rulemaking authority on its power to make reasonable cause
determinations. 124
Finally, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required
that jurisdictions with a history of discrimination, or "covered
jurisdictions," obtain approval, or "preclearance," for any change
to a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting" from either the
United States Attorney General or the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. 125 To obtain preclearance for
the voting change, the covered jurisdiction had the burden of
proving that the new voting standard or procedure "does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race." 126 Jurisdictions
usually submitted their voting changes first to the Attorney
General since it often required less time to obtain Attorney
General approval. As a result, the Attorney General through the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice took the lead
role in administering the preclearance process. In this role, the
Attorney General either precleared the change or rejected the
change through objection letters that offered an explanation of
the reason for the disapproval. 127 In addition to its preclearance
authority over voting changes, the Attorney General, like HEW

122

Id.
42 USC

§ 2000e-12(a).

See also White, 1995 Utah L Rev at 60 (cited in note 102)
(describing the mysterious adoption of the provision limiting EEOC rulemaking
authority to procedural regulations).
124 See Moot, 1 Admin L J at 219-21 (cited in note 65) (describing
the multiple bases
for the EEOC's authority to issue interpretative guidelines).
12'
42 USC § 1973b(a)(1); 42 USC § 1973c(a).
126 42 USC § 1973a(c).
123

127

See Hiroshi Motomura, PreclearanceUnder Section Five of the Voting Rights
Act,

61 NC L Rev 189, 192 (1983). If the Attorney General objected, the covered jurisdiction
could either make modifications to the voting change to satisfy the objection or seek
approval for the change from the federal district court for the District of Columbia. See
id at 191.
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and the EEOC, also issued guidelines interpreting ambiguities
in the statute. 12 8
Congress failed to clearly define critical terms in all three of
these statutory provisions. For example, in Title VI and VII,
Congress failed to clearly define discrimination leaving
unanswered whether proof of discrimination required evidence
of intent or merely effect.129 In Section 5 of the VRA, Congress
left ambiguous the meaning of discriminatory purpose and
effect.130 The statute failed to establish whether the baseline for
measuring the purpose or effect of a voting change was what
existed prior to the change or some hypothetical nondiscriminatory state. These ambiguities emerged as the subject
of litigation in the years following the enactment of the statutes.
On several occasions, the Supreme Court and the responsible
agencies played competing roles in resolving these ambiguities.
2.

The pre-Cheoronera: civil rights and the judicial
abandonment of "great deference."

a) Supreme Court application of "great deference."
Initial struggles over the meaning of the civil rights statutes
occurred in the early 1970s when heightened deference
frameworks predominated. As described in Part I, the Court in
that period was willing to give "great deference" to all forms of
agency interpretive actions-adjudications, legislative rules, and
non-legislative rules. 131 During that early period, the Court
similarly
applied "great
deference"
to early
agency
interpretations of Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act and

See J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, 1965 2007, 86 Tex L Rev 667, 689 (2008) (describing the Department of
Justice's early role in issuing guidelines interpreting Section 5 of the VRA).
129 Title VI states, "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 42 USC § 2000d. The principal provision of Title VII states, "[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
"s Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits any covered jurisdiction from
adopting a voting change "that has the purpose or will have the effect of diminishing the
ability of any citizen of the United States on account of race or color." 42 USC § 1973c.
.s. See Part I.A.
128
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the Voting Rights Act, even though all of the relevant agency
interpretations were in the form of non-legislative rules. 132
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act represented the most active
arena of civil rights litigation. This made sense in light of the
fact that it is the only one of the three statutes for which
Congress expressed a clear preference for a private litigation
model of enforcement. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, however, was not absent from decisions about the
meaning of the statute despite its limited enforcement authority
under the Act. One of the principal means by which the EEOC
asserted its authority over statutory meaning was through the
issuance of interpretive guidelines. In the two years
immediately following the enactment of Title VII, the EEOC
issued guidelines on discrimination because of sex and religion
and on employee selection procedures. 133 Even though the EEOC
lacked explicit statutory authority to issue these guidelines, the
Supreme Court in four early cases accorded the agency's
interpretations "great deference."
In the landmark 1971 case of Griggs v Duke Power Co,134
the Court addressed whether it was permissible under Title VII
for employers to require that employees have a high school
education or pass standardized intelligence tests as a condition
for employment in, and transfer to, higher paying departments.
These requirements disproportionately excluded African
American applicants and employees. The case implicated the
meaning of two statutory provisions: Section 703(a)'s prohibition
on employment practices that discriminate on account of race
and Section 703(h)'s authorization for employers to use "any
professional developed ability test." 135 The EEOC issued
guidelines on employee selection procedures that interpreted
Section 703(h) to permit employment tests that disparately
harmed African Americans only if they were job-related. 136 The
Court, citing Udall v Tallman, determined that this
interpretation by "the enforcing agency" was "entitled to great
See, for example, Griggs u Duke Power Co, 401 US 424 (1971).
.ss See 29 CFR §§ 1604, 1605.
134 401 US 424 (1971).
132

.s.Id
1s6

at 426-34.
The EEOC did not

directly interpret Section 703(a). But the Court's
interpretation of discrimination in Section 703(a) establishing a disparate impact
standard did draw on the agency's construction of Title VII even though the Court never
explicitly gave deference to this EEOC construction. See id at 431-32.
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deference" and upheld the EEOC's interpretation, concluding
that it "express[ed] the will of Congress." 1 37
In a second early Title VII case, Espinoza v Farah
Manufacturing Co, 1 38 the Court addressed the question under
Title VII of whether discrimination on the basis of "national
origin" encompassed discrimination on the basis of citizenship
status. 139 In an interpretive guideline, the EEOC explained that
it did. 140 The Court, citing to Griggs, explained that the EEOC's
interpretation of the statute is "no doubt entitled to great
deference" but concluded that the "application of the guideline
would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent not
to reach the employment practice in question." 14 1
In a third early Title VII case, Albermarle Paper Co v
Moody, 14 2 the Court again gave "great deference" to the EEOC's
interpretation
of the
job-relatedness
requirement
for
employment tests.143 But in the case, the judicial application of
the great deference standard to EEOC interpretive guidelines
received its first challenge as Justices Burger and Blackmun
argued that the Court did not owe the agency interpretation
such deference.144 The justices reasoned that because the agency
lacked the authority to issue the guidelines and the guidelines
had not been subjected to notice-and-comment procedures, a
lesser form of deference should apply instead.14 5 Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, responded simply by quoting Justice
Burger's unanimous opinion in Griggs: the EEOC's guidelines
were entitled to "great deference" because they constituted "the
1s7 Id at 433-36 (examining the legislative history of Title VII
and finding that the
guidelines' requirement that employment tests be job related is consistent with the
intent of Congress).
"s 414 US 86 (1973).
139 See id at 87. Section 703(a) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See 42 USC § 2000e-2(a).
140 According to the EEOC interpretive guideline: "Because discrimination on the
basis of citizenship has the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin, a
lawfully immigrated alien who is domiciled or residing in this country may not be
discriminated against on the basis of his citizenship." Espinoza, 414 US at 92, quoting 29
CFR § 1606.1.
141 Espinoza, 414 US at 94.
142 422 US 405
(1975).
143 See id at
431.
144 See id at 449 (Blackmun concurring in judgment); see id at
451-52 (Burger
dissenting).
141 See id at 449 (Blackmun concurring in judgment), see id at 451-52 (Burger
dissenting).
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administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing
agency."14 6
Finally, in a fourth case decided a year after Albermarle,
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court in McDonald v
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co, 14 7 gave great deference to an
EEOC interpretation of Title VII as protecting white employees
from discrimination. 148 Justice Burger and Blackmun's decision
to join the decision was mysterious given their concerns
expressed in Albermarle about giving great deference to
interpretations not subject to notice - and-comment procedures.
In reviewing agency interpretations of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act in two cases decided in the early 1970s, the
Court was just as consistent in giving heightened deference to
the Attorney General's view of the statute. Despite the lack of
explicit statutory authority to issue guidelines interpreting the
ambiguities in Section 5, the Attorney General promulgated
guidelines interpreting Section 5 in 1971 and also expressed his
view about the meaning of the statutory provision in testimony
before Congress during the 1970 and 1975 re-authorizations of
the statute. The Court gave heightened deference to each of
these interpretations of the Act.
In Perkins v Matthews,14 9 the Court addressed whether
changes in the location of polling places and city boundaries
were "voting changes" that required the Attorney General's
preclearance under Section 5 of the VRA. 15 0 The Court
determined that the two changes did affect voting and then cited
the Attorney General's testimony before Congress that the
changes required preclearance. 15 1 Quoting Udall, the Court

146

Espinoza, 414 US at 431.

147

427 US 273 (1976).

See id at 279. The requirement that statutes apply to all classes within the
statutory classification had long been settled under the Equal Protection Clause and was
not considered controversial by even the more liberal justices. See, for example, Yick Wo
u Hopkins, 118 US 356, 369 (1886) ("[E]qual protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws.").
148

149

400 US 379 (1971).

"s See id at 382.
..
' In this testimony during the 1970 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, the
Attorney General explained that the "Department [of Justice] regarded relocating polling
places and annexing territory as falling within the Act." To support this testimony, the
Department of Justice presented evidence that prior jurisdictions submitted similar
changes, which demonstrated that the Attorney Generals interpretation was already
accepted by at least some of the covered jurisdictions. Id at 391-92.
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concluded that "th[is] interpretation given the statute by the
officers or agency charged with its administration" was entitled
to "great deference."1 52 In Georgia v United States, 153 the Court
was less explicit in its application of the "great deference"
framework, but no less deferential to the Attorney General's
interpretation. 154 In interpretive guidelines titled "Procedures
for the Administration of Section 5," the Attorney General
published rules for voting change submissions and objections.
These rules required, inter alia, the Attorney General to object
to voting changes within sixty days and placed the burden on
the submitting party to prove that the voting change did not
violate the Act.155 Using the language of heightened deference,
the Court held that the Attorney General's "choice of proof
standards" was "reasonable" and "consistent with the Act."156
In neither case did the Court mention the fact that the
agency did not promulgate its interpretations through the more
formalized notice - and-comment procedures. This omission
suggests that the form of the agency interpretation was not
relevant to the Court's deference choice.
Finally, in this period, the Court also appeared to give
heightened deference to HEW's interpretation of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act. In Lau v Nichols, 157 the question raised was the
validity under Title VI of a school district's decision to deny
language instruction to students who lacked English-speaking
skills. 15 8 As in the Title VII and VRA cases, the agency
interpretations that the Court reviewed were in the form of an
interpretive guideline issued by HEW. 15 9 These guidelines
prohibited the disbursement of federal funding to schools that

112

Id at 391 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

..
s 411 US 526 (1973).
114
See id at 538-39.

...
Id at 536-37. The Court conceded that Section 5 did not authorize the Attorney
General to promulgate any regulations, but found questionable authority for the
issuance of the interpretive guidelines in a section of the United States Code on
Government Organization and Employees. Id at 536 (contending that 5 USC § 301,
which gives to "[t]he head of an Executive department' the power to 'prescribe
regulations for the government of his department, . . . [and] the distribution and
performance

of its business

regulations").
11 Id at 538-39.
117 414 US 563 (1974).
"s

See id at 566.

19

See id at 566-67.

. ..

,'

is

surely

ample

legislative

authority

for the

258

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2014

deny educational opportunities to persons on the basis of
national origin or due to language deficiencies. 160 The guidelines
required schools to take "affirmative steps to rectify the
language deficiency in order to open its instructional program to
these students." 16 1 Perhaps most controversially, the HEW
guidelines also prohibited the utilization of criteria or methods
of administration "which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination" or have "the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishments of the objectives of the
program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or
national origin." 162
For the majority, the case was less about what deference
was owed to the interpretive guidelines and more about whether
the federal government had the authority to act in accordance
with the guidelines. 163 The Court simply held that the federal
government did not exceed the limits of its authority in
establishing conditions for the disbursement of money to
schools. 164 But for those in concurrence, which included Justices
Burger and Blackmun, the guidelines were valid because they
were "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling
legislation." 165 The Department's consistent construction of the
statute to require "affirmative remedial efforts to give special
attention to linguistically deprived children" was therefore
"entitled to great weight." 166
In sum, the Court in the early Civil Rights Act and VRA
cases consistently granted heightened deference to agency
interpretations of these statutes. The Court applied this
heightened deference even though the agency interpretations
were in the form of interpretative guidelines that lacked binding
legal effect and none of the agencies had been affirmatively
160

See id at 567-568 (describing the series of interpretive guidelines adopted by

HEW).

16' Lau, 414 US at 568, quoting Department of Health and Human Services, Notice,
35 Fed Reg 11595 (1970).
162 Id, quoting 45 CFR § 80.3(b)(2).
1s Nowhere in the case does the Court cite to cases relying on the
"great deference"
standard or the lesser Skidmore deference.
164 Lau, 414 US
at 569.
16 Id at 571 (Blackmun concurring).
1
Id. HEW's interpretation of Title VI can be seen as raising a constitutional issue
since it addressed the validity of a national origins classification, but the justices in
concurrence did not seem to view the interpretation in that light as they did not discuss
the Fourteenth Amendment or any cases addressed under it.
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authorized to issue such guidelines. With the exception of two
justices dissenting in the Title VII case of Albermarle, the
deference dichotomy was irrelevant. The clear message from the
Court was that the agencies controlled the meaning of the civil
rights statutes and the judicial role was limited to ensuring that
in these cases the administrative interpretations were
consistent with congressional intent. The Court never asserted
its authority to independently judge the meaning of statutes in
the context of competing agency interpretations. In the next
section I argue that when the Court turned to more
constitutionally charged and controversial questions of statutory
interpretation, there was a marked shift in its deference
doctrine.
b) The revival of Skidmore. Prior to the Court's Title

VII decision in General Electric Co v Gilbert, the Skidmore
deference doctrine appeared dead. Only in rare cases did the
Court apply the doctrine, none of which involved civil rights
statutes. 167 In fact, during the very term that the Court revived
Skidmore deference in Gilbert, it applied "great deference" in
another case involving an agency interpretation of Title VII.
However, once revived in Gilbert, Skidmore deference would be
more regularly applied in the Court's review of agency
interpretations of civil rights statutes. Thus far, scholars have
failed to satisfactorily identify the reason for this Skidmore
revival.
The Court's revival of Skidmore deference in Gilbert is
easier to understand once we examine the constitutional context
surrounding the case-in particular, a related constitutional
case decided two years before Gilbert, Geduldig u Aiello. 168 In
Geduldig, a conservative majority of the Court held that the
exclusion of pregnant women from a state disability insurance
program did not constitute an impermissible gender
classification under the Equal Protection Clause. 169 Reasoning
167

See note 49 (citing the four cases between the late 1940s and Gilbert in which the

Court applied Skidmore deference).
16" 417 US 484
(1974).
169 See id at 497. Geduldig

was decided at a time when equal protection doctrine
related to gender classifications was very much in flux. The Supreme Court was divided
on whether gender was a suspect classification entitled to strict scrutiny. See generally
Frontiero u Richardson, 411 US 677 (1973). The Court ultimately settled on the finding
that gender was a quasi-suspect classification entitled to intermediate scrutiny. See
Craig u Boren, 429 US 190, 197-98 (1976) (announcing the intermediate scrutiny
standard for gender classifications).
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that "[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women
are not," the Court concluded that there was no evidence from
the record that the selection of risk covered in the insurance
program "worked to discriminate against any definable group or
class." 170 Since the law did not classify, the majority proceeded
to uphold the law under a very lenient form of rational basis
review. 171
Two years later, the Court in Gilbert addressed whether a
similar pregnancy exclusion from a disability plan violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. 172 In an interpretive guideline, the
EEOC construed the Title VII prohibition on sex discrimination
to encompass "disparate treatment of pregnancy disabilities in
the employment context." 1 7 3 According to its jurisprudence of the
prior six years, the Court should have deferred to the EEOC as
the primary interpreter of the statute, but the Court in Gilbert
took a different path.
Although Gilbert raised an issue of statutory interpretation,
the Court made immediately apparent the influence that the
constitutional decision in Geduldig would have on its
interpretation of Title VII. The Gilbert majority announced early
in the opinion:
While there is no necessary inference that Congress, in
choosing [the language of Section 703(a)(1)], intended to
incorporate into Title VII the concepts of discrimination
which have evolved from court decisions construing the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

170

Geduldig, 417 US at 496-97.

See id at 495.
See Gilbert, 429 US at 127.
17s The EEOC interpretive guideline stated:
171
172

Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy . . . are, for all job-related
purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any
health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in
connection with employment. Written and unwritten employment policies and
practices . . . shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the
same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
29 CFR § 1604.10(b). Since the prohibition on sex discrimination was inserted into the
House version of the civil rights bill at the last minute and was subject to limited debate
in the Senate, many of the ambiguities in its application remained. See Robert Stevens

Miller Jr, Sex Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 Minn L Rev
877, 879-83 (1966) (describing the legislative consideration of the sex discrimination
provision under Title VII).
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the similarities between the congressional language and
some of those decisions surely indicate that the latter are
a useful starting point in interpreting the former. 174
The Court explained that its constitutional jurisprudence
was particularly relevant since Congress failed to define the
term "discrimination."17 5 Given this statutory ambiguity, equal
protection cases "afford an existing body of law analyzing and
discussing that term in a legal context not wholly dissimilar to
the concerns which Congress manifested in enacting Title
VII."176 Analogizing from the meaning of "discrimination"
articulated in Geduldig, the majority concluded that the
pregnancy exclusions from the disability plan did not constitute
sex discrimination under Title VII. 177
To justify its exercise of control over the meaning of the
statute, the Court reasoned, as the two Albemarle dissenters
had, that the EEOC's interpretation was not entitled to great
deference because the interpretive guidelines lacked the force of
law. 178 Rather than being entitled to great deference, the Court,
citing Skidmore, explained that the interpretive guidelines
would only receive the weight that accorded with their
persuasiveness. 179 The Court found the guidelines unpersuasive
and adopted the interpretation of sex discrimination it had
established in its constitutional jurisprudence. 180
174

Gilbert, 429 US at 133.

See id.
Id. The Court therefore determined that the "decision in Geduldig v Aiello, ...
dealing with a strikingly similar disability plan, is quite relevant in determining
whether or not the pregnancy exclusion did discriminate on the basis of sex." Id.
177 See id at 134-36.
178 See Gilbert, 429 US at 141. The Court explained that the evaluation
of the
interpretations entitlement to "great deference" must be evaluated on the basis of the
recognition that "in enacting Title VII, [Congress] did not confer upon the EEOC
authority to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to that Title." Courts, therefore,
'may accord less weight to ... guidelines than to administrative regulations which
Congress has declared shall have the force of law." Id.
179 Id at 141-42.
171

176

180 Id at 145. The Court proceeded to find that the interpretation contained in the
guidelines were not persuasive because the EEOC did not consistently apply it. Id at
142. This may have been an appropriate basis for finding that the interpretation failed
the Skidmore deference standard, but it was mere pretext for applying Skidmore in the
first place. In subsequent pre-Cheuron cases, the Court gave no deference to EEOC
interpretations of Title VII despite the lack of any evidence that the agency's
interpretation was inconsistent with a prior one. See, for example, Trans World Airlines,
Inc v Hardison, 432 US 63, 77 (1977) (finding that an EEOC guideline interpreting the
religious accommodations requirement under Section 703(a)(1) did not provide any
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Justices Brennan and Marshall denounced the majority for
abandoning the "great deference" standard that had been
consistently applied to the Commission's guidelines in prior
cases. 181 The justices argued that Congress left to the EEOC the
complex economic and social inquiries that go into determining
the meaning of discrimination in the employment context and
that the Court should have recognized "the unique
persuasiveness of EEOC interpretations in the area." 182
In Gilbert, the justices clearly considered the "great
deference" and Skidmore deference standards to be distinct. The
application of Skidmore deference in Gilbert represented a
rejection of agency primacy in the determination of statutory
meaning. Instead, the Court elevated itself into the dominant
interpretive role by granting itself the highly discretionary
authority of deciding whether an agency's interpretation is
persuasive.
The Court's abandonment of "great deference" in Gilbert
was not an isolated incident. That same year, the Court in Beer
v United States 183 declined to give any deference to the Attorney
General's interpretation of Section 5 of the VRA, an
interpretation that also implicated an ongoing constitutional
controversy.18 4 Beer raised the question of the meaning of
discriminatory "effect" under the statute. 185 Although the Court
held in Griggs that the Title VII prohibition on discrimination
encompassed a discriminatory-effects standard,1 8 6 the Court, by
the time it decided Beer, was in the process of rejecting that
standard as a basis for proving a constitutional violation under
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court in Washington v
Davis1 87 held that in only the rarest of cases would proof of
discriminatory impact alone be a sufficient basis for an equal
guidance); International Brotherhood of Teamsters u United States, 431 US 324, 369
(1977) (refusing to defer to an EEOC interpretation of Section 703(h) prohibiting a
seniority system that 'locked minority workers into inferior jobs and perpetuated prior
discrimination").
181 Gilbert, 429 US at 155-56 (Brennan concurring and dissenting), citing Albemarle

Paper Co, 422 US at 431; Griggs, 401 US at 433-34; Phillips v Martin Marietta Corp,
400 US 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall concurring).
182 Gilbert, 429 US at 155-56 (Brennan concurring and dissenting).
'8 425 US 130 (1976).
184 See
id.
1ss

See id at 135-41.

1s6

See Griggs, 401 US at 431-32.

1s?

426 US 229 (1976).
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protection violation. 188 A challenger to a state action under the
Equal Protection Clause would instead have to prove that the
state's act was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 189 One
major reason for the Court's rejection of a constitutional
discriminatory effect standard was its potential intrusion on
state authority. 19 0 The Court's refusal to defer to the Attorney
General's more expansive interpretation of discriminatory effect
under Section 5 in Beer can be seen as a response to this
constitutional concern with effects-based standards for judging
discrimination.
Section 5 of the VRA not only included an explicit
discriminatory effects standard, but also placed the burden on
the covered jurisdiction to prove that its voting change would
not have such an effect. 191 The Court in Beer addressed the
question of the proper baseline for measuring discriminatory
effect. The answer would shape how broadly the discriminatory
effects standard would reach into the authority of covered states
to adopt voting changes. In Beer, the Court reviewed the
Attorney General's preclearance objections to the city of New
Orleans's reapportionment of its city council districts. 192 In the
objection letters, the Attorney General appeared to rely on the
Court's earlier equal protection jurisprudence in measuring
discriminatory effect from the baseline of equal opportunity for
members of minority groups to elect their candidate of choice. 193
Under this baseline, if the reapportioned districts failed to
provide racial minorities with equal opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice, usually measured in terms of a
proportional opportunity for minority-preferred candidates to
188 See id at 241. The Court in a series of cases establishing the discriminatory
purpose standard explained, "a law's disproportionate impact is [not] irrelevant in cases
involving Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination." Id. But in order for proof of
a state action's disparate impact to alone be a basis for a constitutional violation, the
challenger must show "a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race."
Village of Arlington Heights u MetropolitanHousing Development Corp, 429 US 252, 266
(1977).
189 See Davis, 426 US at 239.
190 The Court explained that subjecting state action to a discriminatory effects
standard "would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes." Id at 248.
191 42 USC § 1973b.
192 See Beer, 425 US
at 135-36.
193 See Beer u United States, 374 F Supp 363, 369 n 26, 370 n 33 (DDC 1974)
(reproducing the Attorney General's two objections to New Orleans's redistricting plans).
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win elections, the change would not be precleared. 19 4 For
southern jurisdictions like New Orleans, which at the time had
never elected an African American to the city council or drawn
any districts that provided minority-preferred candidates with
an opportunity to win elections, 195 the establishment of a
baseline of equal opportunity to elect under Section 5 would
force a dramatic change in their districting scheme.
The Court rejected this interpretation, declining to give any
deference to the objection letters. The Court denied deference
even though it had given heightened deference to the Attorney
General's interpretations contained in congressional testimony
and interpretive guidelines in two prior Section 5 cases. Instead,
relying on a very dubious reading of the legislative history, the
Court independently determined that the baseline for measuring
discriminatory effect would be the prior voting scheme. 196 A
voting change would only be deemed to have the effect of
discriminating if it "would lead to a retrogression in the position
of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral
franchise." 197 The
Court's
interpretation
of
discriminatory effect in Beer essentially returned discretion to
the states in the reapportionment of electoral districts. Under
the Supreme Court's interpretation, the covered jurisdiction only
had to ensure that racial minorities were no worse off than
before. Given the historical resistance of the covered
jurisdictions to giving minorities any political power, the Court's
standard gave these jurisdictions extremely broad discretion to
reapportion districts how they saw fit. 198
194 See id. See also id at 388 ("The value to which the
New Orleans black vote is
legally entitled is 'a theoretical optimum designed to give fair representation to both
minority and majority groups in the City."') (citation omitted).
195 Id at 374-75.
196 See Beer, 425 US at 141. Far from supporting a non-retrogression
standard, the
language in the Senate Committee in support of renewal of the Voting Rights Act in
1975 raises rather than resolves the question of the proper baseline for assessing a
dilutive practice. In the report, Congress stated:

The standard [under § 5] can only be fully satisfied by determining on the basis
of the facts found by the Attorney General [or the District Court] to be true
whether the ability of minority groups to participate in the political process
and to elect their candidate of choice is augmented, diminished, or not affected
by the changes affecting voting.
Id, quoting HR Rep No 94-196 at 60.
197 Id.
198

One scholar described the consequences of the Court's interpretation of Section 5
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In dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan found the
majority's construction awkward and contrary to the purposes of
Section 5 of the VRA. 199 Interestingly, unlike in Gilbert, where
the two justices vehemently opposed the Court's refusal to give
"great deference" to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, the
dissenters appeared to concede that such deference was not
appropriate here. Rather, consistent with the majority's
approach in Gilbert, the justices independently determined,
without reference to any clear indicator of congressional intent,
that the standard of proof under Section 5 is "undoubtedly tied
to the standards of the Constitution." 200 The dissenters merely
critiqued the majority for adopting a construction inconsistent
with the constitutional standard they found appropriate for the
case.201

In Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 202 the
Court for the third time denied heightened judicial deference to
agency interpretations of a civil rights statute. Bakke involved
the statutory and constitutional validity of an affirmative action
program to increase the enrollment of racial minorities in the
University of California, Davis School of Medicine. 203 From a
statutory perspective, the case raised the question of the
meaning of discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
and in particular, whether UC Davis' admissions preferences for
racial minorities
who had experienced
past societal
discrimination constituted "discrimination" against whites. 2 04
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had
issued regulations through notice - and-comment rulemaking
in Beer as perverse; the non-retrogression standard "reward[ed] those jurisdictions with
a history of the worst dilution of black electoral strength." Those jurisdictions now had
free rein to install racially discriminatory voting structures so long as they were no more
discriminatory than the ones that existed before. See Richard L. Engstrom, et al,
Louisiana, in Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, eds, Quiet Revolution in the

South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990 103, 115 (1994).
See Beer, 425 US at 146.
Id at 148. The dissenters merely cited to language in a prior opinion upholding
the validity of Section 5. Id, quoting South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 334
(1966) ("The Act suspends new voting regulations pending scrutiny by federal authorities
to determine whether their use would violate the Fifteenth Amendment.").
201
See id at 156-58.
202
438 US 265 (1978).
203
See id at 269-79.
204 Id at 291-95 (rejecting a two-class theory in
which whites would receive a
different degree of protection than African Americans under the Equal Protection
Clause).
199

200

266
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permitting such affirmative action admissions programs under
Title VI.205 Justice Powell, who wrote the influential opinion in
Bakke, 206 ignored the agency regulation. He reasoned from a
selective reading of the legislative history that the statutory
standard was indistinguishable from the constitutional
standard. 207 According to Justice Powell, "Title VI reveals a
congressional intent to halt federal funding of entities that
violate a prohibition of racial discrimination similar to that of
the Constitution." 2 08 Given the relationship between the
statutory and constitutional meaning of discrimination, it was
not necessary to look to the HEW regulation to address the
statutory ambiguity. 209 Instead, Justice Powell resolved the
ambiguity about the meaning of discrimination under Title VI
through an independent determination of what discrimination
meant under the Constitution. 2 10
It is perhaps not that surprising that Justice Powell, who
was relatively conservative on most civil rights issues, 2 1 1 did not
interpretation of
more liberal agency
defer to the
"discrimination." But the four most liberal justices in
concurrence also refused to defer to the agency's interpretation
of Title VI. While the concurring justices suggested that the
regulations were "deserving of respect," 2 12 it seems clear from
20'
The HEW regulation provided: "Even in the absence of such prior
discrimination,
a recipient in administering a program may take affirmative action to overcome the
effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of particular
race, color, or national origin." Id at 344-45 (Brennan concurring in judgment and
dissenting in part), quoting 45 CFR § 80.3(b)(6)(ii).
206 Although Justice Powell wrote only for himself, his opinion articulated the
constitutional standard that would apply to future affirmative action cases. See Bertrall

L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial
Conceptionof Politics, 101 Cal L Rev 1565, 1597-1605 (2013).
207

See Bakke, 438 US at 284.

Id. But see Abernathy, Title V and the Constitution,70 Georgetown L J at 25-30
(cited in note 116) (arguing that the key compromise that secured passage of Title VI
was one in which the agencies were given the authority to define discrimination).
209 This approach contrasted with what the Court expressed
in an opinion that
Justice Powell joined in Lau, which was to look to the HEW regulation first in
ascertaining the meaning of Title VI.
210 Bakke, 438 US
at 305-14 (applying the equal protection analysis to the
affirmative action program). The decision to ignore the HEW regulation was particularly
notable considering that, unlike the interpretive guidelines at issue in Lau, the
affirmative action regulations in Bakke were promulgated through notice-and-comment
procedures. Id at 341-43 (Brennan concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
208

211

See Ian F. Henry Lopez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and

Reactionary Colorblindness,59 Stan L Rev 985, 1034-46 (2007).
212
See Bakke, 438 US at 346 (Brennan concurring in judgment and dissenting in
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their opinion that the deference did not extend to the meaning of
discrimination, which was considered a determination within
the Court's constitutional domain. 213 Rather, deference would be
contingent on the agency's interpretation being in concert with
the justices' interpretation of the Constitution. 2 14 The liberal
justices explained in agreement with Justice Powell, "Title VI
prohibits only those uses of racial criteria that would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment." 215 If the agency's interpretation had
failed to accord with the concurring justices' constitutional
understanding, it is reasonable to surmise that the justices
would have ignored it.
In sum, the pattern of deference to agency interpretations in
the pre-Cheoronera does not map on very well to the deference
dichotomy or the other explanations for deference choices. The
Court applied "great deference," Skidmore deference, and no
deference to agencies' interpretive guidelines, regulations, and
congressional testimony with few references to the principle
underpinning the deference dichotomy-that only rules issued
with the force of law should receive heightened deference. While
the more liberal justices in Gilbert complained about the
conservative majority's refusal to apply heightened deference to
the more liberal agency interpretation, these justices, for the
most part, went along with similar denials of heightened
deference in Beer and Bakke.
Instead, what connects Gilbert, Beer, and Bakke, is the
Court's consistent denial of more than minimal deference to
part).
213 This is reflected in the Court's usage of the administrative
agency more to
confirm its conclusion as to the meaning of discrimination, than as an authoritative
interpretation to be deferred to. See id at 346-49 (Brennan concurring in judgment and
dissenting in part).
214 Id at 336-37 (Brennan concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Justice
Brennan explained, "the legislative history shows that Congress specifically eschewed
any static definition of discrimination in favor of broad language that could be shaped by
experience, administrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine." Id at 337. For
Justice Marshall, in concurrence, the starting point for the meaning of discrimination
under Title VI was his interpretation of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. See
id at 396-97 (Marshall concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) ("It is plain that
the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to prohibit measures designed to remedy
the effects of the Nation's past treatment of Negroes.").
21' Bakke, 438 US at 328-32 (Brennan concurring in judgment and dissenting
in
part). The four more conservative justices-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens,
Stewart, and Rehnquist-argued that the affirmative action program was inconsistent
with the plain language of Title VI. See id at 412-18 (Stevens concurring in judgment
and dissenting in part).
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agency interpretations when they aimed to resolve questions
central to ongoing constitutional controversies. The proximity of
statutory questions about the meaning of discrimination and
discriminatory effect to the constitutional domain appeared to
have a greater influence on deference choices than both the
deference dichotomy and ideology. The Court in these cases
seemed to manipulate deference doctrine to resist an
administrative
role
in
making
Constitution-based
determinations. In the next section, I examine the post-Chevron
era, which offers further support for this theory of judicial
resistance to administrative constitutionalism.
3.

Post-Chevron: the Court's inconsistent application of
heightened deference to interpretive rules

When the Court decided Chevron in 1984, it apparently
resolved the question of when agency interpretations merited
heightened deference. The Chevron Court held that so long as
the agency's interpretation is not contrary to the clear intent of
Congress and is reasonable, courts should defer. 2 16 As detailed
in Part I, this heightened deference standard mirrored the
"great deference" standard that the Court had frequently
applied since the mid- 1960s. 2 17
In terms of the deference dichotomy, although the Court in
Chevron reviewed an agency interpretation in the form of a
legislative rule, the language in the opinion appeared to indicate
that heightened deference would apply to all forms of agency
interpretations. 2 18 The Court frequently applied Chevron
deference to both formal legislative rules and informal agency
interpretations until the Court formally adopted the deference
dichotomy in Christensen v Harris County (2000) and United
States v Mead Corporation(2001).219
But the Court treated some agency interpretations in the
civil rights domain differently. The Court applied minimal to no
deference when reviewing the EEOC's interpretation of

216

CheBron, 467 US

at 843.
See Part I.B.
218
See Cheuron, 467 US at 843-44 (deriving the basis for deference from a theory of
implicit delegation in which statutory ambiguity is presumed to be a delegation to
agencies to interpret statutes and limiting the judicial role to ensuring that the agency's
interpretations are reasonable).
219
See Part I.B.
217
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discrimination under Title VII and the Attorney General's
interpretation of discriminatory purpose under the VRA. The
Court did so even while continuing to extend Chevron's reach to
other interpretations by these agencies that did not implicate
constitutional meaning.
Two years after Chevron, the Court in Meritor Savings
Bank v Vinson, 220 revived Skidmore deference doctrine again in
the context of its review of an EEOC interpretation of Title
VII. 2 2 1 Similar to Gilbert and in contrast to two other cases
decided the same year in which the Court gave Chevron
deference to informal agency interpretations, 222 Mertor Savings
implicated a statutory question of constitutional dimension. The
statutory question in the case was whether sexual harassment
constituted discrimination on the basis of sex-an issue that
directly implicates the meaning of the prohibition on sex
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. 22 3 While the
Court ultimately concurred with the EEOC's interpretive
guidelines, it did not apply Chevron deference to the agency's
interpretation of the statute. Rather, the Court cited Gilbert and
quoted Skidmore for the proposition that the interpretation was
"not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,"
but rather "constitute[d] a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance." 2 2 4 In other words, the EEOC's interpretation was
merely persuasive authority as to the meaning of the statute
that the Court retained the discretion to take or leave.

477 US 57 (1986).
See id at 65.
222 In the two cases, the Court extended Chevron deference
to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation's interpretation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and the
Food and Drug Administration's interpretation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act even though the regulations were never promulgated as regulations. See Young v
Community Nutrition Institute, 476 US 974, 977-81 (1986) (acknowledging that the FDA
set tolerance levels for harmful substances in food through an informal process, but
arguing that the agency's interpretation should nonetheless be given Chevron deference);
220
221

Federal Deposit Ins Corp v PhiladelphiaGear Corp, 476 US 426, 439 (1986) ("Although
the FDIC's interpretation of the relevant statute has not been reduced to a specific
regulation, we conclude nevertheless that the FDIC's practice and belief [are entitled to
deference under Chevron].").
223 Mertor Savings, 477 US at 59.
224 Id at 65, quoting Gilbert, 429 US at 141-42. See
also Moot, 1 Admin L J at 244
(cited in note 65) (contrasting the DC Circuit's deferential review of the EEOC guidelines
with the Supreme Court's more independent review of the meaning of the statute).
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In subsequent Title VII cases, the Court alternated between
taking or leaving the EEOC's interpretation while consistently
applying the lower Skidmore deference standard in many cases
and no deference at all in others. 225 In fact, the overwhelming
majority of the cases in which the Court explicitly applied
Skidmore deference between Chevron and Christensen-Mead
involved questions of the meaning of civil rights statutes, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 22 6
One potential response might be that the Court refused to
accord heightened deference in these cases based on its negative
view of the EEOC. If the Court distrusted the EEOC or thought
it lacked expertise or political accountability, the Court's
decision to give minimal deference might not have been
motivated by the constitutional dimensions of the interpretive
questions but by concerns about the agency itself.227 This
argument is weakened by two post-Chevron doctrinal
developments. First, the Court in a case decided after Meritor
Savings did give Chevron deference to an EEOC interpretation
of Title VII. In the 1988 case of EEOC v Commercial Office
Products Co, 22 8 the Court addressed inter alia the statutory
221

See, for example, EEOC u Arabian American Oil Co, 499 US 244, 257-58 (1991)

(applying Skidmore deference and rejecting the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII);
Ansonia Board of Educationu Philbrook, 479 US 60, 66-71 (1986) (applying no deference
to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'
InternationalAssociation u EEOC, 478 US 421, 465-66 (1986) (applying no deference to
the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII).
226
Of the eight cases applying Skidmore deference between Cheuron and
Christensen,six of them involved judicial review of agency interpretations of civil rights
statutes. See Sutton u United Airlines, 527 US 471, 502 (1999) (applying Skidmore
deference in the review of the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA); Bragdon v Abbott, 524
US 624, 642 (1998) (applying Skidmore deference to the review of the EEOC's
interpretation of the ADA); EEOC u Arabian American Oil Co, 499 US 244, 258 (1991)
(applying Skidmore deference to the review of the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act); Ansonia Board of Education u Philbrook, 479 US 60, 69 n 6 (1986)
(applying Skidmore deference to the review of the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act); Local No 93, InternationalAssociation of Firefighters,AFL-CIO u
Cleveland, 478 US 501, 518 (1986) (applying Skidmore deference to the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); Meritor Savings, 477 US at 65
(applying Skidmore deference to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act). For cases applying Skidmore that did not involve judicial review of agency
interpretations of civil rights statutes, see Metropolitan Stevedore Co v Rambo, 521 US

121, 136 (1997); Martin u Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 499 US
144, 157 (1991).
227
See, for example, Hart, 74 Fordham L Rev at 1949-51 (cited in note 102); Wern,
60 Ohio St L J at 1578-80 (cited in note 102).
228 486 US 107 (1988).
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question of what it meant, for purposes of determining whether
a charge has been timely filed under Title VII, to "terminate" an
agency proceeding. 229 Ignoring the deference standard applied in
Mertor Savings, a majority of the Court agreed that the EEOC
interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference. Justice
Marshall writing for a plurality of four justices conceded that
the EEOC's interpretation of "terminate" may not have
represented the most natural or frequent usage of the word. 230
"But it is axiomatic that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII,
for which it has primary enforcement responsibility, need not be
the best one by grammatical or any other standards. Rather, the
EEOC interpretation of ambiguous language need only be
reasonable to be entitled to deference." 231 Justice O'Connor
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment agreed with
the plurality's application of Chevron explaining, "sufficient
ambiguity exists to warrant deference to the agency's
2 32
construction of the word 'terminated."'
It is also unlikely that the Court's distrust of the EEOC
drove its denial of deference because the Court also selectively
refused to defer to the Attorney General's interpretations of the
Voting Rights Act when they implicated constitutional
controversies. For issues that did not implicate constitutional
questions, the Court gave heightened deference-for example to
the Attorney General's determination of what voting changes
were covered by Section 5 of the VRA. 2 33
229
230

231
232

See id at 109-10.
See id at 115.

Id.
Commercial Office Products, 486 US at 125 (O'Connor concurring). A proponent

of the "deference dichotomy" might point out that Meritor Savings involved an
interpretive rule while Commercial Office Products involved a legislative rule. See 42
USC § 2000e-12(a) (giving the EEOC the authority to promulgate procedural regulations
pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking). Yet, the Court never mentioned this fact
about the form of the agency action in its decision to grant Chevron deference in
Commercial Office Products. Rather, Justice O'Connor in her concurrence offered the
closest thing to an explanation for the application of Chevron in Commercial Office
Products, suggesting, "deference is particularly appropriate on this type of technical
issue of agency procedure." Commercial Office Products, 486 US at 125 (O'Connor
concurring). O'Connor's explanation rested more on the substance of the agency
interpretation rather than its form or source. Id.
233 Through informal agency actions, the Attorney General
interpreted Section 5 to
include changes to election dates in covered jurisdictions within the category of voting
changes requiring preclearance. See National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People v Hampton County Election Commission, 470 US 166, 178-79 (1985); annexation
of vacant land, City of Pleasant Grove v United States, 479 US 462, 467-68 (1987);
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But when it came to statutory questions under Section 5 of
the VRA raising constitutional issues, the Court refused to apply
heightened deference to the Attorney General's interpretation.
For example, in a series of three cases decided between 1995 and
2000, the Court denied heightened deference to the Attorney
General's interpretation of discriminatory purpose under Section
5 each time.
In the early 1980s, the Attorney General issued an
interpretive guideline construing the Section 5 prohibition on
covered jurisdictions adopting voting changes that had a
discriminatory purpose. The guideline required covered
jurisdictions to prove that any voting change would not violate
Section 2 of the VRA in that it would not deprive minorities of
an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. 2 34 In
Miller u Johnson,235 the Court began to chip away at this
expansive interpretation of discriminatory purpose, revealing
along
the
way
its
resistance
to
administrative
236
constitutionalism.
In Miller, the Court considered whether the
Justice Department's interpretation of Section 5 of the VRA was
a sufficient basis for a district to draw predominantly race-based
electoral districts. 2 37 The Court refused to provide heightened
changes to a political body's decision-making authority, Presley v Etowah County
Commission, 502 US 491, 508-09 (1992); and a political party's addition of a candidate
registration fee, Morse v Republican Party of Virginia, 517 US 186, 190, 200-01 (1996).
The Court did not uphold all of these interpretations, but it did consistently apply a
heightened deference framework distinct from Skidmore deference. See City of Pleasant
Grove, 479 US at 468 (applying "great deference"); NAACP, 470 US at 178-79 (same);
Morse, 517 US at 200-01 (applying heightened deference standard applicable to agency
interpretation of its own regulations); Presley, 502 US at 508 (applying Chevron
deference). An argument could be raised that the Attorney Generals broad
interpretations of Section 5 to include many voting changes not foreseen by Congress
implicated constitutional federalism concerns. Such granting of heightened deference
should therefore be considered inconsistent with a theory of judicial resistance to
administrative constitutionalism. But it is important to note that at the time the Court
deferred to the Attorney General's interpretations in these Section 5 cases, the Court
deemed the federalism boundaries to be judicially unenforceable. Instead, according to
the Court, the "internal safeguards of the political process," provided protection for state
authority against unduly burdensome federal actions. Garcia v San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 556 (1985). These VRA cases may,
therefore, have raised issues of a constitutional dimension, but they did not implicate
ongoing constitutional controversies being decided by the Court.
234
See United States Department of Justice, Revision of Procedures for the
Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed Reg 486, 486-501
(1987).
235
515 US 900 (1995).
236
See id at 923.
237
See id at 922.
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deference, explaining "[w]ere we to accept the Justice
Department's objection [to the voting change] itself as a
compelling interest adequate to insulate racial districting from
constitutional review, we would be surrendering to the
Executive Branch our role in enforcing constitutional limits on
race-based official action." 2 38 In other words, it was for the
Court, not the agencies, to decide the permissibility of racebased actions under the Constitution. Because of the need to
avoid the serious constitutional question raised, the Court
explained that the heightened deference ordinarily given to the
Attorney General's interpretation of Section 5 in prior cases was

not appropriate in Miller.2 39
In a case decided two years later, Reno v Bossier Parish
School District I, 2 40 the Court started to directly address the
meaning of discriminatory purpose under Section 5-an
interpretive question of continuing import in the Court's
constitutional jurisprudence. 24 1 The question raised in Bossier
ParishI was whether Section 5 requires the Attorney General to
deny preclearance when the voting change violates Section 2 of
the VRA. 2 4 2 In its guidelines, the Justice Department had
interpreted Section 5 to deny preclearance
in those
circumstances. The Court again acknowledged that Chevron
deference was normally accorded to the Attorney General's
interpretation of Section 5 of the VRA, but it avoided giving such
deference by citing a presumption about congressional intent.
Despite a footnote in the Senate report suggesting that Congress
did intend to incorporate the Section 2 standard into Section 5,
the Court expressed "doubt that Congress would depart from the
settled interpretation of § 5 and impose a demonstrably greater
burden on the jurisdictions covered by § 5 . . . by dropping a
footnote in a Senate report instead of amending the statute
itself."243

Id at 923.
Miller, 515 US at 923.
240
520 US 471 (1997).
241
See id at 474. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Court continued to address cases about
the standard of proof necessary to prove an equal protection violation. See, for example,
Lewis u Casey, 518 US 343 (1996); Hernandez u New York, 500 US 352 (1991); McCleskey
v Kemp, 481 US 279 (1987); Batson u Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986).
242
See id.
243 Id at
484.
238

239

274

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2014

Finally, in the 2000 case of Reno u Bossier Parish School

Board II, 2 44 the Court again refused to apply heightened
deference to the Attorney General's interpretation of Section
5.245 The case directly raised the question of the meaning of
discriminatory purpose under Section 5.246 Rather than look to
the agency's consistent interpretation of discriminatory purpose
for guidance, 247 the Court instead analogized to its own past
interpretation of discriminatory effect in Beer.2 4 8 The Court
explained that the discriminatory purpose prong of Section 5
must incorporate the same baseline applicable to the
discriminatory effect standard announced in Beer. Since the
Court had held the statutory prohibition on discriminatory effect
referred only to retrogressive effect in Beer, the statutory
prohibition on discriminatory purpose must refer only to
retrogressive purpose. 249 The Court adopted this interpretation
despite clear congressional efforts to overrule the nonretrogression standard when it reauthorized Section 5 of the
VRA in 1982. The Court also acknowledged that its
interpretation would make the purpose prong of Section 5
essentially redundant to the effects prong as it would only
punish the incompetent legislator who intended to adopt a
retrogressive voting change but was not able to do so. 2 50
Thus, as it did in the pre-Cheoron era, the Court in its
review of agency interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act and Section 5 of the VRA gave heightened deference to some
interpretive rules and not others. This pattern conflicted with
the deference dichotomy. In addition, even though the agencies'
interpretations seemed to accord with the views of the more

244

528 US 320 (2000).

See id at 329-31.
See id at 322-23.
247 According to the Attorney Generals
interpretation of discriminatory purpose,
covered jurisdictions were required to prove that the voting change would provide racial
minorities with an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. See United
States Department of Justice, Revision of Proceduresfor the Administration of Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed Reg 486, 486-501 (1987).
248 Board ParishII, 528 US at 329-31.
249
See id. In dissent, Justice Souter colorfully argued, "if today's decision achieves a
symmetry with Beer, the achievement is merely one of well-matched error." Id at 342
(Souter concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250 Id at 332 (acknowledging the limited reach of the purpose prong under the
interpretation so that it only prohibits voting changes that have a non-retrogressive
purpose).
241
246
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liberal justices, these justices only once argued for the
application of heightened deference. 25 1 Finally, the justices'
inconsistency in the application of heightened deference to the
agency interpretations of Title VII and the VRA suggest that the
justices did not consider the general competency of the agencies
and the complexity of the statutes to be factors in their
deference choice. Instead, a consistent feature of the interpretive
rules for which the Court denied deference is that they
implicated questions that were the subject of ongoing
controversies in the Court about the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Court's tendency to refuse to defer to administrative
constitutionalism continued in the Mead era when the Court
established doctrinally the deference dichotomy in case law. In
this era, the Court continued to deny heightened deference to
agency interpretations of civil rights statutes, even those in the
form of legislative rules, when they implicated judicially
enforceable constitutional issues. The Court did so through a
process of Chevron avoidance.
4.

The Mead era: Chevron avoidance and the ADA and
ADEA.

In the most recent set of cases, the Court has refused to
defer to agency interpretations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). These cases are interesting because they span the
periods both before and after the Court's enshrinement of the
deference dichotomy into doctrine in Christensen and Mead. And
yet the Court, in its review of legislative rules during both
periods, never applied heightened Chevron deference to agency
interpretations that addressed questions of a constitutional
dimension. The Court, however, did apply heightened Chevron

In Meritor Savings, four liberal justices in dissent argued that the EEOC
interpretive guidelines were entitled to great deference. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 US at 74 (Marshall J, dissenting). However, in two other Title VII cases implicating
constitutional issues, the liberal justices did not argue for the application of heightened
deference to the EEOC's interpretations. See Ansonia, 479 US at 66-71 (ignoring the
agency interpretation in a case addressing the requirements of religious accommodations
under Title VII); Local 28, 478 US at 465-66 (acknowledging and agreeing with a
contemporaneous EEOC interpretation making "race-conscious remedies for unlawful
discrimination . . . available" but failing to explicitly give deference to it).
211
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deference to such rules when the agency's interpretation did not
implicate a constitutional controversy.
The Court maintained the illusion of a deference dichotomy
in these cases by avoiding an express choice of deference
doctrines. In isolation, these Chevron avoidance moves are
questionable, but mostly unremarkable. But these decisions
examined collectively show a clear pattern of Supreme Court
resistance to administrative constitutionalism. In this section, I
examine ADEA and ADA cases, after first briefly describing
these two younger siblings to the Civil Rights Act.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967252
makes it unlawful for employers, employment agencies, and
labor organizations "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age." 2 53 Like the Civil
Rights Act, the statute lacks any detailed definition of the
meaning of discrimination. As originally enacted, the
Department of Labor had the authority to enforce the Act by
bringing suits on behalf of individual claimants in court and
promulgating
regulations
through
notice- and-comment
procedures. A reorganization of the executive branch in 1978
transferred this enforcement authority to the EEOC. 2 54 The
EEOC was given the same authority to enforce the Act through
both interpretive and legislative rules.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits
disability discrimination in employment, 255 access to public
services, 256 and public accommodations. 2 57 Multiple agencies are
involved in the enforcement of the Act, with the EEOC
responsible for the employment title and the Department of
Justice and Transportation responsible for the public services
and public accommodations titles. 2 58 Congress gave the agencies
212

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub L No 90-202,
81 Stat 602,
§§ 621-34.

codified at 29 USC
213
214

29 USC § 623(a)(1).
3 CFR § 321. See also 29 USC § 628 ("[T]he Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission may issue such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary or
appropriate for [enforcing the Act].").
21'
42 USC § 12112.
216

217
258

42 USC § 12132.
42 USC §§ 12182-84.
42 USC

§§

12116-17 (granting the EEOC authority to issue regulations to
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authority to enforce their assigned provisions through the
issuance of legislative and interpretive rules. 2 59
Under the ADEA and the ADA, controversies continued
about the meaning of discrimination. In age and disability cases
decided both pre- and post-Mead involving judicial review of
legislative rules, the Court declined to give Chevron deference to
administrative interpretations of discrimination. In Olmstead u
LC, by Zimring,260 a pre-Mead case reviewing the Attorney
General's interpretation of discrimination under the ADA, the
Court simply stated that it "need not inquire" into whether the
regulations were entitled to Chevron deference. 26 1 The majority
instead applied Skidmore deference and found the regulations
persuasive under that standard. 262 The rest of the justices
declined to give any deference in deciding the meaning of
discrimination under the statute. 263

In Smith v City of Jackson,264 a post-Mead case addressing
the meaning of discrimination under the ADEA, 265 nearly every
justice refused to give Chevron deference to the EEOC
interpretation of discrimination, which authorized disparate
impact claims, even though the interpretation was in the form of
a legislative rule. 2 66 Justice Stevens writing for a plurality of the
Court simply looked to the regulation as support for his
enforce the employment title); 42 USC §§ 12134, 12149, 12164, 12186, 12188 (granting
the Attorney General and the Department of Transportation Authority to issue
regulations to enforce the public services and public accommodations titles).
219
See provisions cited in note 258.
260
527 US 581 (1999).
261
Olmstead v LC, by Zim ring, 527 US 581, 598 (1999).
262
See id.
263 Id at 611-613 (Kennedy concurring) (engaging in
an independent determination
of the meaning of discrimination under the ADA and relying on the regulations as mere
supporting evidence for this determination); id at 618-19 (Thomas dissenting) (looking to
the Court's prior interpretations of discrimination under other civil rights statutes
rather than to the regulations). In fact, Justice Thomas explained in a dissent joined by
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia that, given his independent judgment about the meaning
of discrimination, there was no need to even "review the integration regulation
promulgated by the Attorney General." Id at 622 n5. The justice does suggest that a
heightened deference framework would have applied if the agency interpretation
accorded with his judgment about the meaning of discrimination, but that would have
been a rather empty form of deference.
264
544 US 228 (2005).
261
See generally, id.
266
Seven of the nine justices refused to give deference to the agency's
interpretation,
even though four of the justices agreed with the agency's interpretation. See id at 239
(Stevens joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer); id at 263 (O'Connor joined by Kennedy
and Thomas).
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independent interpretation of the statute. 267 Justice O'Connor,
writing for two other concurring justices, did not rely on the
regulation at all, suggesting that the regulation did not
interpret the statute to authorize disparate impact claims. 2 68
Justice Scalia stood alone in arguing that Chevron deference
should apply, pointing to the fact that the legally binding
regulations represented the authoritative views of the agency
responsible for administering the statute. 269
Along with disputes about the meaning of discrimination,
there were recurring questions concerning who fell within the
category of protected classes under the ADA and ADEA. Did the
ADEA bar discrimination against workers over forty, if it was in
favor of even older workers? Were persons with HIV or bad
eyesight entitled to protection as disabled persons under the
ADA? Like the meaning of discrimination, delineating which
classes of individuals are entitled to special legal protections has
been central to judicial interpretations of the Equal Protection
Clause. Under the equal protection tiers of scrutiny framework,
the Court has more closely scrutinized laws that harm classes of
individuals bearing immutable qualities who are politically
powerless and have suffered from a history of discrimination. 2 7 0
In the Court's constitutional terminology, these categories of
individuals are considered discrete and insular minorities or
members of a suspect class. 2 7 1
When Congress adopts statutes that protect particular
classes of individuals from discrimination, it is making a quasiconstitutional claim about the suspect nature of the
classification. The congressional decision to protect the aged and
disabled is in some tension with the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence. Nine years after Congress determined that the
aged were entitled to special statutory protection from
discrimination under the ADEA, the Court held that the aged
were not a suspect class for purposes of heightened scrutiny

See id at 239.
See Smith, 544 US at 263 (O'Connor concurring in judgment).
269 Id at 243-44 (Scalia
concurring).
270
See, for example, J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, the Equal
Protection Clause and the Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 Va L Rev 945, 97880 (1975) (linking Carolene Products footnote four to the Supreme Court's equal
protection suspect class analysis).
271
See id.
267

268
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under the Equal Protection Clause. 272 Eleven years after
Congress resolved to give special statutory protection to the
disabled in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (a predecessor to the
ADA), 273 the Court denied suspect status under the Constitution
to the disabled. 274 Congress, then in turn, indirectly repudiated
that judicial determination five years later by giving the
disabled more protections under the ADA. In fact, using the
Court's own constitutional terminology, Congress in its
legislative findings supporting the ADA declared the forty-three
million disabled persons protected by the Act to be discrete and
insular minorities. 275
In response
to these congressional
exercises
of
constitutional authority, the Court has manipulated deference
doctrine to secure greater control over determinations about who
is suspect and entitled to special legal protections. In particular,
the Court has denied Chevron deference to agency
interpretations about who is entitled to statutory protections
under the ADEA and ADA.
The Court first addressed a statutory question about the
meaning of disability under the ADA in the 1998 case of
Bragdon v Abbott. 2 76 The specific question was whether a person
infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) was
disabled and therefore entitled to protections against
discrimination under the Act. 2 77 As the Court noted, "[e]very
agency to consider the issue under the [predecessor Act] found
statutory coverage for persons with asymptomatic HIV."2 78 Yet
despite being in agreement with these consistent agency
determinations, the Court declined the invitation to defer under
Chevron.279 Instead, the Court explained that it was unclear
whether Chevron deference could be accorded to an agency's
272

See MassachusettsBoard of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307, 312-14 (1976).

See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-112, 87 Stat 355, codified at 29 USC
§ 701 et seq.
273

274

City of Cleburne, Tex u Cleburne Living Center, Inc, 473 US 432, 442-47 (1985).

See 42 USC § 12101(a)(1).
524 US 624 (1998).
277
See id at 628. The ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual." 42
USC § 12102(2). This was virtually the same as the definition that Congress gave to
"handicapped individual" under the earlier Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, Pub L 93-112, codified at 29 USCA §§ 701 et seq.
278 Bragdon, 524 US at 642.
279
See id.
271
276
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interpretation when Congress did not delegate authority to a
single agency. 280 Since it was unclear whether Chevron
deference was appropriate, the Court proceeded to simply treat
the agency views as guidance under Skidmore for its
independent judgment that the ADA protected persons infected
with HIV.2 81
In a case decided the next year, Sutton v United Air Lines,
2 82
Inc,
the Court again engaged in Chevron avoidance, this time
to override an agency interpretation. 2 83 Sutton addressed the
question of whether individuals with extremely poor vision were
disabled under the ADA and therefore entitled to protection
against employment discrimination. 2 84 In the case, the Court
avoided giving Chevron deference to EEOC legislative rules and
interpretive guidelines construing the Act to protect these
persons. 285 The Court justified Chevron avoidance by explaining
that "disability" was in the definitional section of the statute for
which Congress gave no agency the authority to interpret. 286
But, as Justice Breyer argued in dissent, the term "disability"
also appeared in the employment title, for which Congress
clearly delegated interpretive authority to the EEOC. 2 87 The
Sutton majority nonetheless proceeded to independently
determine whether the class of persons with extremely poor
vision fit within the statute's definition of disability. 2 88

In a third case, General Dynamic Land Systems, Inc v
Cline,2 89 the Court again avoided applying Chevron deference on
the issue of a class's entitlement to statutory protection. Cline
involved the question of whether younger workers were entitled
to legal protections under the ADEA when employers favored
older workers. 290 The Court explained it did not need to decide
whether to apply Chevron or Skidmore deference to the EEOC's
legislative rule interpreting the Act because the language and
280
281

Id.
Id.

282

527 US 471 (1999).

283

See
See
See
See
See

284
285
286
287
288
289
290

id at 479-82.
id at 475-77.
id at 479.
Sutton, 527 US at 479.
id at 514 (Breyer dissenting).
See id at 482-83.
540 US 581 (2004).
See id at 584.
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structure of the statute indicated a clear congressional intent
solely to "protect the older from arbitrary favor for the
younger." 29 1 The majority's finding of statutory clarity in
statutory text that seemed quite ambiguous was questionable,
but that is not what made the case unusual. Instead, it was the
decision to interpret the statute outside of the Chevron
framework. When the justices find clarity in ambiguous text
they usually do so at Chevron step one, which asks whether the
intent of Congress was clear. 292 But in Cline, the court used
statutory clarity as an excuse to avoid making a choice about the
applicable deference framework. The Court has very rarely done
this in other cases. 2 93 Even the justices in the dissent who
agreed with the agency's interpretation of the statute refused to
apply Chevron.294 Only Justice Scalia, writing alone, argued that
the Court should have applied Chevron deference and deferred
to the agency interpretation. 2 95
These Chevron avoidance cases are especially notable
because the Court did not always avoid giving Chevron
deference to agencies' formal interpretations of the ADEA and
ADA. As it did with respect to the Civil Rights Act and the VRA,
the Court treated agency interpretations involving nonconstitutional matters very differently. For example, the Court
applied heightened deference without hesitation to agencies'
statutory determination about the administrative procedures
that a claimant was required to follow under the ADEA, 296 the
scope of exemptions for discriminatory bona fide employee
benefit plans under the ADEA, 297 and the affirmative defenses

291

292

Id at 600.
This form of textual review has been characterized as hypertextualism-the

process of finding "linguistic precision where it does not exist". See Richard J. Pierce Jr,

The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence
in the Administrative State, 95 Colum L Rev 749, 752 (1995).
293
See Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 221-22 (cited in note 37) (describing a step-zero
process in which the Court must ascertain whether the agency interpretation has the
force of law to determine whether Skidmore or Cheuron applies).
294
Cline, 540 US at 605 (Thomas dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that "we
need not address" whether Cheuron deference would apply to the agency regulation in
the case).
295
See id at 601 (Scalia dissenting) (arguing that the statute is ambiguous and that
the agency's interpretation was "neither foreclosed by the statute nor unreasonable").
296 See Oscar Mayer, 441 US
at 761.
297

See Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio u Betts, 492 US 158, 171 (1989).
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available to the employer under the ADA. 2 98 In each of these
cases, the Court could have avoided Chevron deference using the
same methods as it had in Bragdon, Sutton, and Cline, but the
Court instead applied Chevron. The contrast between these two
sets of cases provides further support for the argument that the
deference dichotomy is, at best, an incomplete explanation for
the Court's deference choices in the civil rights domain.
These ADEA and ADA cases also further undermine the
argument that ideology drives deference choices. With the
exception of Justice Scalia in Cline and Justice Breyer in Sutton,
all of the justices engaged in Chevron avoidance even when the
agency's interpretations accorded with their view of the meaning
of the statute. Thus, these cases suggest that the Court's choice
of deference doctrine is not merely about ideology. Finally, the
pattern of cases does not fit the explanation that the statute's
complexity or judicial views about the agency's competency
influenced deference choices. Again, the Court vacillated
between applying heightened deference to some agency
interpretations of the ADEA and ADA and minimal-to-no
deference to others, which undercuts both the statute- and
agency-specific accounts.
B.

Why Judicial Resistance to Administrative
Constitutionalism?

What is at stake when the Court chooses to apply a
particular deference model? Explaining judicial resistance to
administrative constitutionalism requires answering this
question. When the Court applies heightened deference to an
agency interpretation under "great deference," Chevron
deference, or any similar framework, it essentially concedes to
the agency the primary authority to interpret the statute. 299 The
Court sends the important message that it is the agency that
exercises principal control over the meaning of the statute. The
Court can, of course, still override these interpretations, but it

298

See Cheuron, 536 US at 78-79.

299

See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled JudicialReview of Agency

Action, 58 Vand L Rev 1443, 1446 (2005) ("While Cheuron deference
agency, not a court, exercises interpretive control, Skidmore deference
opposite."); Diver, 133 U Pa L Rev at 568 (cited in note 25) ("The
deferential and independent review is really about the allocation
responsibility between administrative agencies and courts.").

means that an
means just the
choice between
of interpretive
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must overcome the burden of showing that the agency's
interpretation is contrary to clear congressional intent or is
unreasonable. As empirical studies of deference doctrine reveal,
such standards still leave room for judicial manipulation to
secure preferred outcomes. 300 But the message of agency control
over the meaning of the statute is significant independent of
whether it increases the likelihood that the agency
interpretation will be accepted. Deference relegates courts to
secondary actor status in statutory interpretation. It makes the
agency the focal point of contestation and deliberation about
statutory meaning. When agencies are the focal point,
individuals and interest groups are likely to focus greater
attention on the agency's actions, participating in the process of
decision-making when the opportunity arises and otherwise
providing information about factual context and interests
implicated by the agency decision. In addition, the legislative
and executive branches have greater incentives to oversee these
agency actions.
In contrast, when the Court subjects agency interpretations
to minimal deference under Skidmore, or other similar
frameworks, or provides no deference at all, it is asserting
judicial primacy over the meaning of the statute. The Court then
has the discretion to give the agency interpretation whatever
persuasive value the Court chooses to assign to it. Using this
discretion, the Court may, as some empirical studies suggest,
end up using this authority to overturn the same proportion of
agency interpretations as it does under the heightened deference
framework. 30 1 But even so, the key consequence is that the
Court, not the agency, emerges as the central focal point of
contestation and deliberation about the meaning of the statute.
Statutory interpretive questions are resolved in the courts, not
though engagement between individuals, interest groups, and
agencies with some oversight from the legislative and executive
branches. The judicial choice about deference doctrine is thus a
choice about who controls the meaning of statutes, and
particularly who is involved in statutory interpretation, with
implications that go beyond any impact on particular case
outcomes. 302
soo See Part I.C.
so' See Part I.C.
302
The question that this also raises is why the Court would ever give up control
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Further, when agencies interpret statutes in ways that
engage ongoing constitutional controversies in the courts, their
actions have direct implications for judicial supremacy. This
judicially constructed principle, which asserts that courts are
the final and exclusive interpreter of the Constitution, has been
central to the Supreme Court's institutional identity since the
1950s when the Court famously equated its interpretation of the
Constitution with the Constitution itself.303 The Court's
assertion of this supreme authority over constitutional meaning
in recent cases narrowing congressional authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment has been well chronicled. 304 In a series
of cases in the 1990s, the Court made clear that Congress lacked
the authority to define the substance of equal protection or due
process. 305 Such authority belonged only to the Court. Judicial
over the meaning of a statute. The Administrative Procedure Act certainly did not
mandate that courts relinquish control to agencies over the meaning of statutes. In fact,
the language of the judicial review provision of the statute suggests the opposite to be
the case-that Congress intended for courts to exercise control over the meaning of
agency-administered statutes in all contexts. See 5 USC § 706 ("To the extent necessary
to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action."). The Court, however, is resource
constrained and has to make choices about when and how it wants to exercise its
authority. To review as a de novo matter all statutory interpretation questions addressed
by agencies would likely overwhelm the judicial system. See, for example, Judith Resnik,
Migrating,Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining
Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J Empirical Legal Stud 783, 798-801 (2004) (comparing the
number of federal and agency adjudications in 2001 and finding that federal judges
'closed just under 60,000 'adversary proceedings,"' while agencies closed an estimated
720,000 proceedings).
sos See Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958).
304
See, for example, Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution
from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 Ind L J 1, 17-41
(2003).
so' Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the authority to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause with appropriate legislation. See US Const Amend XIV, § 5.
The Court in a series of cases has narrowed congressional enforcement authority to
remedying constitutional violations found by the Court. See City of Boerne v Flores, 521
US 507, 519 (1997) (limiting congressional authority to remedying or preventing
unconstitutional action and prohibiting Congress from substantively changing the
meaning of the Constitution). The Court has invalidated provisions as exceeding
congressional enforcement authority that have given the aged and the disabled the right
to sue states for damages under statutes protecting these groups from discrimination.
See Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356, 368-74 (2001)
(finding that the enactment of the employment title of the ADA exceeded congressional
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore depriving private
individuals a right to sue states under the statute); Kimel v FloridaBoard of Regents,
528 US 62, 80-91 (2000) (concluding that the ADEA exceeded congressional authority
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore depriving private individuals a
right to sue states under the statute). In each case in which the Court has invalidated a
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resistance to administrative constitutionalism emerges as
another means by which the Court asserts judicial supremacyyet it has thus far been overlooked. Through resistance to
administrative constitutionalism, the Court has denied to
agencies the authority to both independently define the
substance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and
determine how those amendments should apply in particular
contexts. Rather, through denial of deference, the Court has
retained supreme authority over constitutional meaning.
C.

Implications of Judicial Resistance to Administrative
Constitutionalism

What
does
judicial
resistance
to
administrative
constitutionalism mean for the future of civil rights statutes?
Maggie Lemos has demonstrated empirically that Congress's
choice of where to delegate authority-to courts or agencieshas been a central determinant of Title VII's scope. 306 If one
believes in the rhetoric of the deference dichotomy, the choice to
delegate belongs to Congress-all Congress needs to do is give
agencies the authority to promulgate rules with the force of law,
and then the Court will defer pursuant to Chevron and Mead.307
Implicitly, then, Congress can control the scope of Title VII
through its choice of delegate, even when it does not choose to
specify that scope directly.
But in the civil rights domain it appears that the choice of
delegate does not entirely belong to Congress. When agencies
promulgate rules on non-constitutional matters, the Court will
usually respect Congress's choice of delegate. But when the
statutory question implicates a constitutional controversy, the
Court ignores or overrides the congressional choice and gives
itself authority over the meaning of the statute irrespective of
the form of agency interpretation or the demands of the relevant
deference framework. When Constitution-laden statutory
ambiguities arise, the meaning of the civil rights statutes will be
strongly influenced by the Court's constitutional jurisprudence.

statute as exceeding congressional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it has conceded that Congress maintains authority to adopt statutes
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power.
so6 Lemos, Vand L Rev at 389 (cited in note 102).
so7 See White, 99 Mich L Rev at 582-83 (cited in note 102).

286

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2014

While Congress has, at times, reasserted control over the
meaning of civil rights statutes through amendments, the
infrequency of those amendments demonstrates Congress's
constraints in playing an active role in the evolution of
statutes. 308 What we can therefore expect in the future is that
the agencies will be given authority to define more technical
statutory provisions, such as unique procedural defenses and
burdens of proof in contexts of statutory ambiguity. But since
many of the central substantive components of these statutes
implicate constitutional controversies, the scope of these
statutes will likely continue to reflect judicial constructions of
the Constitution.
CONCLUSION

The Court has defined a role for itself as the principal
interpreter of the Constitution. Due to the limits of its
institutional power and legitimacy, the Court has not always
been able to exercise supreme authority over the meaning of all
aspects of the Constitution. 309 But since the mid-twentieth
century, the Court's authority to define the extent of individual
rights protected under the Constitution has grown to the point
where it is now virtually unchallenged by Congress, the
President, or the People. 3 10 The Court's claim of supreme
constitutional authority to define what rights the Constitution
protects has led it to limit congressional authority to enforce
alternative constitutional constructions.

sos See Bertrall L. Ross 11, Against Constitutional Mainstreaming,78 U Chi L Rev
1203, 1228-29 (2011) (arguing statutory overrides are exceedingly rare). There have only
been three significant legislative overrides of judicial interpretations of civil rights
statute in the past fifty years. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott
King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub L No 109246, 120 Stat 577, overriding Reno v Bossier Parish School Board, 528 US 320 (2000);
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991), codified at 42 USC
§ 2000e-2(k) (overriding a series of Supreme Court interpretations of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-555, 92 Stat 2076 (1978),
codified at 42 USC § 2000e(k), overriding Gilbert.
309
See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of JudicialSupremacy, 102 Colum L Rev 237, 240 (2002)
("Underlying the political question doctrine ... is the recognition that the political
branches possess institutional characteristics that make them superior to the judiciary
in deciding certain constitutional questions.").
s0 Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Popular
Review 208 (Oxford 2004) (describing judicial supremacy with respect to the Constitution
as the prevailing conventional wisdom).
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But even before the Court began to directly constrain
Congress's constitutional authority, the Court actively resisted
the authority of agencies to elaborate constitutional meaning.
The primary tool for this resistance to administrative
constitutionalism, at least in the civil rights domain, has been
through the choice of deference doctrine. In the civil rights
domain, the Court has consistently denied heightened deference
to agency interpretations implicating ongoing constitutional
controversies even when such denial conflicts with the deference
dichotomy or precedent. The message the Court sends with
these choices is that courts and not agencies represent the
proper forum for public contestation and deliberation over
constitutional values. As a result of such resistance to
administrative constitutionalism, civil rights statutes often hew
to the Court's construction of the Constitution-rather than to
the interpretations of the officials charged with implementing
civil rights. Depending on one's ideological orientation and the
future composition of the Court, that may be a good or bad
thing, but it will not necessarily represent the intent of
Congress.311

s.. While I lack the space to consider the normative merits of administrative
constitutionalism here, in a work-in-progress, I address the case for administrative
constitutionalism head-on. See Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative
Constitutionalism,95 BU L Rev - (forthcoming 2015).

